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A SENSE OF DUTY:
RETIRING THE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" RULE AND
HOLDING GUN MANUFACTURERS LIABLE FOR
NEGLIGENTLY DISTRIBUTING GUNS
RACHANA BHOWMIK, J.D., JONATHAN E. Lowy, J.D.,
ALLEN ROSTRON, J.D., & RACHEL HOOVER*
INTRODUCTION

A company is in the business of making and selling handguns,
known tools of the violent criminal trade. The company knows that a
substantial share of the guns it makes and sells will be purchased in
the thriving unregulated secondary "criminal gun market" by
criminals and young people who are prohibited from possessing these
lethal weapons. The company knows that it supplies the roaring pipeline to the criminal market, a pipeline that starts at its own factory
doors, then funnels through distributors and dealers who sell to gun
traffickers and straw purchasers - often in suspect transactions that
are well-known trafficking methods - then completes its journey in
sales to criminals who wreck havoc on our streets. In those cases in
which the criminal justice system works well, the shooter is punished
to the full extent of the law (albeit after the damage has been done),
and in the cases where the dealer or seller is found to have violated
gun laws, they too are punished. The gun manufacturer, however, the
source of the pipeline, continues to pump its guns into the criminal
market without restriction or limitation, selling guns to any distributor
or dealer, even if they have been indicted or continually sell to gun
traffickers, so long as they meet minimal federal standards. While
manufacturers of far less dangerous products rigorously supervise
their distribution networks, the gun manufacturer takes no steps whatsoever to prevent its guns from ending up in another criminal's hands
and profits from every sale.
* Rachana Bhowmik,J.D. University of Virginia, B.A. Yale University. Jonathan Lowy,
J.D. University of Virginia, B.A. Harvard University. Allen Rostron, J.D. Yale University,
B.A. University of Virginia. Rachel Hoover, J.D. expected 2002, Stanford Law School, B.A.
Williams College. Ms. Bhowmik, Mr. Lowy, and Mr. Rostron are attorneys with the Legal
Action Project of the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence. Ms. Hoover was a summer law
clerk with the Legal Action Project. The authors wish to thank Dawn Canady and Allison
Klein for their assistance with the preparation of this article. The views expressed in this
article are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of any
parties to the cases discussed or any other litigation.
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In a growing number of lawsuits, victims of gun violence, their
families, government entities, and organizations are seeking to hold
gun manufacturers liable in negligence for distributing guns in a manner that supplies the criminal market. The plaintiffs argue that gun
manufacturers' "willful blindness" toward the consequences of their
reckless business practices is negligent and unreasonable.' Gun manufacturers counter that they owe no duty to the public to use reasonable care in distributing their products.2 They argue that they are
guilty, at worst, of failing to "prevent" or "protect" potential victims
from criminal attack.' They claim to be mere bystanders to crimes
committed by third parties over whom they have no control.4 They
argue that they cannot be liable for such nonfeasance unless they have
a "special relationship" with the victims or the shooters, which they
claim they do not.5 The fundamental issue that the courts must decide is whether gun manufacturers owe the public a duty to use reasonable care in distributing their products.6 At this early stage in
these lawsuits, courts have split on the question.7
This article suggests that the gun manufacturers' reliance on the
special relationship rule and the distinction between misfeasance and
nonfeasance is misplaced on factual, legal, and policy grounds. Gun
makers do owe a duty to use reasonable care in distributing guns and
can be held liable for negligently distributing them.8 Under the traditional analysis, gun manufacturers' conduct should be classified as
misfeasance because they engage in affirmative conduct that creates
and increases the risks of foreseeable harm to others.9 Contrary to
what some courts have held, no "special relationship" with victims or
1. See, e.g., City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 2000 WL 1473568, at *15 (Mass.
Super. Ct. July 13, 2000); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 1999 WL 809838, at *1
(Ohio Ct. C.P. Oct. 7, 1999), affd, 2000 WL 1133078 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2000), appeal
allowed, 740 N.E.2d 1111 (Ohio 2001); Penelas v. Arms Tech. Inc., 1999 W*rL
1204353, at
*1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1999), affd, 2001 WL 120529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2001),
cert. denied (Mar. 21, 2001).
2. See Boston, 2000 WIL 1473568, at *15; Cincinnati, 1999 UIL 809838, at *2; see also
Penelas, 1999 IAL1204353.
3. See Boston, 2000 WL 1473568, at *15; Cincinnati, 1999 IL 809838, at *2; see also
Penelas, 1999 WL 1204353.
4. See Boston, 2000 WL 1473568, at *15; Cincinnati, 1999 WL 809838, at *2; see also
Penelas, 1999 WL 1204353.
5. See Boston, 2000 WL 1473568, at *5-6; Cincinnati, 1999 IL 809838, at *2; see also
Penelas, 1999 WrL 1204353.
6. See Boston, 2000 WIL 1473568, at *15; Cincinnati, 1999 WI. 809838, at *2; see also
Penelas, 1999 WL 1204353.
7. See Boston, 2000 WL 1473568, at *15; Cincinnati, 1999 WL 809838, at *2; see also
Penelas, 1999 WL 1204353.
8. See infta notes 156-179 and accompanying text.
9. See infta notes 180-190 and accompanying text.
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shooters should be required for such a duty to exist. By choosing to
distribute lethal weapons in a manner that enables them to be easily
obtained by criminals and others prohibited from possessing guns,
and then to be used to commit violent crimes, gun manufacturers create foreseeable risks that members of the public will be injured when
those guns end up in the wrong hands. Gun manufacturers should be
held liable in negligence for damages that result from their failure to
exercise such care.
This article further argues that the traditional approach is flawed.
While the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance is a significant concept in defining the existence and scope of duties under negligence law, courts have made a mistake by treating these as two
completely separate boxes into which all forms of negligent conduct
can be neatly sorted.' In fact, these concepts are merely two points
on a spectrum. Although some negligence cases clearly involve only
one or the other, many cases include elements of both, and often the
distinction between the two is easily confused.'" When courts treat
misfeasance and nonfeasance as wholly distinct and impose a general
duty to refrain from misfeasance but only impose liability for nonfeasance when a "special relationship" is present,1 2 the traditional approach produces arbitrary and unjustifiable results. This article
argues for retirement of the "special relationship" concept and the
adoption of a more flexible analysis that locates negligent conduct on
the spectrum between active misfeasance and pure nonfeasance, and
focuses on the dangerousness of
defendants' conduct and the foresee3
harm.'
cause
will
it
that
ability
This article first briefly discusses the factual basis for these claims
- how gun manufacturers' distribution practices in the United States
facilitate the supply of guns to underground markets through which
guns flow to convicted criminals, juveniles, and others who cannot legally obtain them.' 4 The article then describes attempts to hold gun
manufacturers legally accountable for injuries resulting from their
negligent distribution of guns and how the "special relationship" rule
has divided courts.' 5 Finally, the article describes three principal
grounds that support the proposed approach to duty analysis. As a
10. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON
(5th ed. 1984).
11. See infra notes 118-125 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 108-155 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 180-313 and accompanying text.

14. See infra notes 19-51 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 52-179 and accompanying text.

ON THE LAW OF TORTS §

56
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practical matter, gun makers should owe a duty of care because they
are engaged in conduct that causes severe and unnecessary harm to
others. 6 As a theoretical matter, principles of economic efficiency
and the underlying premises of tort law support the conclusion that
gun manufacturers should bear the costs of their negligent conduct. 7
As a matter of legal precedent, courts have already moved away from a
rigid approach focused on "special relationships" to a more flexible
approach centering on the degree to which the defendant creates
risks of foreseeable harm to others and can reform his conduct to
avoid doing so.
I.

8

NEGLIGENT DISTRIBUTION OF GUNS AND THE HARM IT CAUSES

The violence caused by the easy availability of handguns in the
United States has been a matter of public knowledge for decades, wellrecognized by gun manufacturers and others.1 9 Public reports have
noted that:
Gun violence represents a major threat to the health and
safety of all Americans. Every day in the United States 93
people die from gunshot wounds, and an additional 240 sustain gunshot injuries. The fatality rate is roughly equivalent
to that associated with HIV infection - a disease that the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has recognized
as an epidemic.2"
The threat posed to young people by gun violence is especially severe:
a teenager in the United States is more likely to die of a gunshot
wound than from all "natural" causes combined." Gun violence is
largely attributable to handguns; an overwhelming majority of guns
used in crime - over 80% - are handguns.2 2 The handgun problem is

caused, in large part, by their easy availability, especially among
16. See infra notes 19-51 and accompanying text.
17. See infta notes 197-232 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 156-179 and accompanying text.
19. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE: FINAL REPORT 169 (1969) ("The availability of guns contributes substantially to violence in American society. Firearms, particularly handguns, facilitate the commission and increase the
danger of the most violent crimes: assassination, murder, robbery and assault.").
20. U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTIcE, PROMISING STRATEGIES TO REDUCE GUN VIOLENCE Xiii
(1999) [hereinafter PROMISING STRATEGIES].
21. See id.; see also Lois A. FINCHERHUT, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
FIREARM MORTALITY AMONG CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND YOUNG ADULTS 1- 34 YEARS OF AGE,
TRENDS AND CURRENT STATUS: UNITED STATES 6
22. See MARIANNE W.

(1993).

ZAWITZ, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, FIREARMS,

JUSTICE: GUNS USED IN CRIME 2 (1995)

vey, 86% involved handguns.").

CRIME, AND CRIMINAL.

("Of all firearm-related crime reported to the sur-
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23
juveniles and criminals who are legally barred from possessing them.
In 1997, one in seven juveniles (14%) reported carrying a gun outside
the home in the previous thirty days. 2 4 Among convicted juvenile offenders, 88% reported carrying guns. 25 Easy access to handguns has
led to a raft of shootings in schools, day care centers, and community
borne by
centers. 26 The financial toll is considerable and the burden
27
the American public is high as a result of gun violence.

Public policy recognizes that because of the grave risks posed by
the easy availability of guns, certain categories of persons are prohibited from possessing them. Federal gun laws are intended to keep
"these lethal weapons out of the hands of criminals, drug addicts,
mentally disordered persons, juveniles, and other persons whose pos28
session of them is too high a price in danger for us all to allow."
However, this policy is regularly undermined by a vast, thriving secondary market, which provides those who are prohibited from buying
guns at retail the means to readily obtain them.
The major source of this unregulated secondary market is not
guns stolen from private citizens, but guns purchased from licensed
gun dealers with the intent to promptly resell or transfer them to prohibited purchasers.2 9 Gun makers are well aware that the retailers and
distributors whom they supply often act, contrary to the spirit of federal law, as willing conduits that enable the continuing, thriving black
market in handguns.3" According to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms (ATF), all new firearms used in crime first pass through
the legitimate distribution system of federally licensed firearm dealers
(FFLs). 3 1
23. See generally JOSEPH F. SHELEY & JAMES D. WRIGHT, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, GUN AGQUISITION AND POSSESSION IN SELECTED JUVENILE SAMPLES, RESEARCH IN BRIEF

24. See PROMISING
25. See id.
26. See id. at 6.

STRATEGIES,

1 (1993).

supra note 20, at 4.

27. See Linda Gunderson, The Financial Costs of Gun Violence, 131 AINNALS OF INTERNAL

483, 483 (1999).
28. Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 825 (1974) (quoting 114 CONG. REC.
13219 (1968) (Statement of Sen. Tydings)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 922.
29. SeeJoseph J. Vince, Jr., Memo from the Chief CGAB SHOTS, Oct. 1998, at 2. See also
MED.

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL,

TOBACCO AND FIREARMS PERFORMANCE REPORT: THE YOUTH CRIME

GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE (1999) (showing that half of investigations involved guns trafficked by straw purchasers; 14% were from other unregulated sellers; 10% from gun shows
and similar venues; 6% from FFLs) [hereinafter PERFORMANCE REPORT].

20, Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802
30. See Affidavit of Robert I. Hass
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) [hereinafter Hass Affidavit].
31. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, A PROGRESS REPORT: GUN DEALER LICENSING &
ILLEGAL GUN TRAFFICKING (1997) (statement of Raymond W. Kelly, Under Secretary
(Enforcement)).
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Many of the handguns that flow into the underground market
are bought from FFLs in suspect transactions, made with the obvious
intent of promptly reselling them to prohibited purchasers. 2 Such
sales include "multiple sales" in which FFLs may sell large numbers of
guns to a single customer in a single transaction (even though it is
highly foreseeable that the multiple-sale guns are intended to be resold on the streets);"3 sales by licensed dealers to "straw purchasers,"
where non-prohibited purchasers fill out the paperwork and complete
a firearm sales transaction and then hand over the weapon to a prohibited purchaser;3 4 unregulated sales at gun shows; 35 and sales by

corrupt dealers "off the books," including dealers who, though licensed, do not even have a storefront, so they sell entirely from their
homes or on the street.3 6 The short intervals of time between the
purchase of many firearms from an FFL to their recovery at a crime
scene ("time to crime") is a strong indicator that many initial sales by
licensed dealers are intended to be conveyed to illegal or irresponsible purchasers.3
Studies have confirmed that these transactions are not merely
"suspect," but are a ready source of handguns for prohibited purchasers.3 Curbing such sales can have a significant effect on gun trafficking to criminals. For example, the Commonwealth of Virginia was
traditionally a primary source state for crime guns.39 By banning mul32. See Mark D. Polston, Civil Liability for High Risk Gun Sales: An Approach To Combat
Gun Trafficking, 19 SETON HALL LEGISJ. 821, 828 (1995).
33. See id. at 828; see alsoJulius Wachtel, Sources of Crime Guns in Los Angeles, California,
21 POLICING: AN INT'L J. OF POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 220 (1998)

(outlining firearms

markets). When a licensed gun dealer sells two or more handguns to an unlicensed person within a five-business-day period, dealers are required to fill out and forward to ATF a
form 3310.4, which lists the guns sold. See 27 C.F.R. § 178.126a. There is no federal limit
on the number of firearms that can be purchased in a single sale, and the only states that
have such limits are Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, and California. See CAL. CODE
§ 12072 (9)(A) (W); MD. CODE. ANN. art. 27, § 442A(a) (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-31140(c) (Law. Co-op. 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2:2(Q) (Michie 2000).
34. See, e.g., Polston, supra note 32, at 828 (discussing "straw purchases" as a ready
source of criminal guns).
35. See id. at 836; see also BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, GUN SHOWS:
BRADY CHECKS AND CRIME GUN TRACES (1999).
36. See Polston, supra note 32, at 836-37; see also BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND
FIREARMS, THE ILLEGAL YOUTH FIREARMS MARKET IN 27 COMMUNITIES 12 (1999) [hereinafter
YOUTH FIREARMS MARKET].

37. See GLENN L. PIERCE ET AL., THE IDENTIFICATION OF PATTERNS IN FIREARMS TRAFFICKA REPORT TO THE UNITEb STATES
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS OFFICE OF ENING: IMPLICATIONS FOR FOCUSED ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES,

FORCEMENT

9-10 (1995) (discussing significance of "time to crime" statistics).

38. See YOUTH FIREARMS MARKET, supra note 36, at 12.

39. See Douglas S. Weil & Rebecca Knox, Effects of Limiting Handgun Purchaseson Interstate Transfer of Firearms, 275 JAMA 1759, 1759 (1996).
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tiple handgun sales in 1993, Virginia eliminated a major source of
crime guns, as evidenced by the subsequent marked decrease in crime
guns nationwide traced to Virginia.4 °
Straw purchases are another significant source of guns to the underground market. Data from tracing projects in twenty-seven cities
nationwide led the Chief of ATF's Crime Gun Analysis Bureau to conclude that "[t]he [most important] single source of firearms is still
illegal traffickers who are acquiring firearms from retail outlets. It still
appears that acquisition of firearms by false declarations and straw
purchasers are still the method preferred by traffickers, both small
and large. ' 41 Recent undercover investigations by Chicago and Wayne
County, Michigan confirmed that many dealers blatantly engage in
straw purchases.4 2
Corrupt licensed dealers also fuel the criminal gun market. Studies suggest that a limited number of licensed gun dealers are the
source for a disproportionate amount of traced crime guns.43 According to one study, in 1998, one percent of all licensed gun dealers were
the source for forty-five percent of the successfully traced crime
guns.4 4
Gun manufacturers know that their lax distribution fuels the
criminal handgun market, but they have deliberately chosen to employ a "hands off" approach to distribution, as Robert Hass, the former Senior Vice-President of Marketing and Sales for Smith &
Wesson, recognized in a sworn statement:
The company [Smith & Wesson] and the industry as a whole
are fully aware of the extent of the criminal misuse of hand40. Of all nationwide crime guns traced to stores in the Southeastern United States,
the percentage of those guns originating from Virginia plummeted from 27% to 19% after
the ban - even though gun trafficking from the Southeastern United States actually increased during that time. For crime guns in New York, the number of crime guns traced to
Virginia dropped from 38.2% before the Virginia one handgun a month law to 15.3 after a precipitous drop of more than 66%. See id. at 1760; see also 'It was easy,' Confessions of a
Gun Trafficker, USA TODAY, Oct. 28, 1999, at Al.
41. See Vince, supra note 29. See also PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 29, at 6 (half of
trafficked guns were straw purchases).
42. Both entities carried out undercover operations involving law enforcement officers
posing as juveniles and criminals who were barred from legally buying guns, blatantly attempting to engage in straw purchases. The dealers overwhelmingly cooperated with the
undercover officers' attempts to obtain firearms through straw purchases. See Barry Meier,
Cities Turn to U.S. Gun TracingDatafor Legal Assault on Industry, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1999, at
A16.
43. See PIERCE, supra note 37; REPORT OF SENATOR CHARLES SCHUMER, A FEW BAD APPLES: SMALL NUMBER OF GUN DEALERS THE SOURCE OF THOUSANDS OF CRIMES (1999) [hereinafter SCHUMER REPORT].
44. See SCHUMER REPORT.
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guns. The company and the industry are also aware that the
black market in firearms is not simply the result of stolen
guns but is due to the seepage of guns into the illicit market
from multiple thousands of unsupervised federal firearms
licensees. In spite of their knowledge, however, the industry's position has consistently been to take no independent
action to insure responsible distribution practices, to maintain that the present minimal federal regulation of federal
handgun licensees is adequate and to call for greater criminal enforcement of those who commit crimes with guns as
the solution to the firearm crime problem ...

I am familiar

with the distribution and marketing practices of the [sic] all
of the principal U.S. handgun manufacturers and wholesale
distributors and none of them, to my knowledge, take additional steps, beyond determining the possession of a federal
handgun license, to investigate, screen or supervise the
wholesale distributors and retail outlets that sell their products to insure that their products are distributed
responsibly."
Despite their knowledge of the criminal misuse of guns
acquired in the underground market, gun makers continue
to willingly supply the market. Even when dealers frequently
engage in suspect or illegal transactions, and even when
trace requests inform manufacturers that particular dealers
continually sell crime guns, the pipeline to the black market
flows with full force, as gun makers continue to supply all
dealers (who meet the minimal federal licensing requirements) with as many handguns as they desire."6
In an age when franchising and integrated, regulated distribution is
common, it is striking that gun makers have decided to regulate retailers only on issues of gun prices.
As retailers' sole source of handguns, gun makers have the power
to impose reasonable restrictions and limitations on how handguns
are sold by those whom they supply, thereby preventing many guns
from being obtained by criminals."7 With the stroke of a pen they
could write into their distribution contracts prohibitions on multiple
sales, sales at gun shows, or sales to dealers who regularly sell a disproportionate number of crime guns. As a result of the on-going litigation against gun manufacturers by governmental entities, Smith &
Wesson, one of the nation's largest gun manufacturers, agreed to a
45. Hass Affidavit, supra note 30,
46. See id.
16-21.
47. See id.

20-21.
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marked change in the way they do business.4" On March 17, 2000,
Smith & Wesson signed a settlement with certain cities, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the New York and
agreed to moniConnecticut attorneys general in which the company
49
tor the downstream distribution of its products.
Even before that agreement, Smith & Wesson implemented some
restrictions on their retailers' conduct and informed them that it
might terminate sales to any dealer who did not agree to refrain from
making sales to "straw purchasers" or any other person who the dealer
had reason to believe made a false or misleading statement. 50 After
the City of Chicago caught on videotape and indicted two dealers en-

gaging in "straw purchases," Smith & Wesson decided to terminate
those dealers for violating the agreement: 5 These actions clearly
demonstrate that gun manufacturers can act to reduce the risk that
criminals and other prohibited purchasers will obtain guns.
Although all gun manufacturers have the ability to supervise and
monitor distribution as stringently - indeed more so - they have not
done so. The industry's willful blindness to the criminal consequences of its negligent distribution is underscored by the fact that all
gun manufacturers other than Smith & Wesson continued to supply

48. See Smith & Wesson Settlement Agreement (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Settlement
Agreement]; Dennis J. Opatrny, Gun Pact Gives Plaintiffs New Ammunition, THE RECORDER,
Mar. 20, 2000, at 1.
49. Under the terms of the Smith & Wesson settlement the company has agreed to
change its distribution practices, including the following: Smith & Wesson will only allow
their guns to be sold by authorized dealers and distributors who must abide by a set of
terms and conditions governing who they can sell guns to, who can sell guns, and where
those guns can be sold. These conditions are well beyond what is required by law or what
is currently done by the industry. Under the agreement, if a dealer or distributor wants to
sell Smith & Wesson guns, they must agree to, among other things: make no sales of any
guns to anyone until that person has passed a background check, regardless of how long
the check takes; make no sales to anyone who has not passed a certified firearms safety
course or exam; require employees to attend annual training and pass a comprehensive
exam on how to recognize suspect sales and how to promote safe handling and storage;
not sell a disproportionate number of guns that are used in crime; implement specific
security procedures to prevent gun thefts; not sell multiple guns until 14 days have passed
after the first gun is sold; not allow children under 18 access to gun stores or sections of
stores where guns are sold without an adult; maintain an electronic record of crime gun
traces and report them to the manufacturer on a monthly basis; not sell weapons attractive
to criminals, such as those with large capacity magazines or semi-automatic assault weapons, regardless of the date of manufacture. Smith & Wesson has also agreed not to market
guns particularly attractive to juveniles or criminals and not to advertise near schools, high
crime zones, and public housing. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 48, at 7-17.
50. See David B. Ottaway & Barbara Vobejda, Smith & Wesson, Stocking Dealer Code of
Responsible Business Practices, Gun Manufacturer Requires Dealer to Sign Code of Ethics, WAixsH.
POST, Oct. 22, 1999, at All.
51. See id.
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suburban Chicago dealers with all the guns they ordered even after
they were videotaped (and televised) willingly engaging in illegal straw
purchases. Gun manufacturers make the same profit from every gun
sold, regardless of whether it is sold as part of a multiple sale to a
trafficker or an individual sale to a law-abiding person. Unless gun
makers are subjected to legal liability when they engage in irresponsible sales that cause injury, they have no incentive to end their willful
and profitable participation in this dangerous underground market.
II.

THE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" RULE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE TO
NEGLIGENT DISTRIBUTION CLAIMS AGAINST
GUN MANUFACTURERS

A growing number of lawsuits seek to reverse these socially perverse incentives and hold gun manufacturers accountable under the
law of negligence for harm resulting from negligent distribution.
Dozens of cities and counties have brought such suits, including Boston, New York City, Washington, D.C., Atlanta, New Orleans, Chicago,
St. Louis, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Detroit, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.5 2 In June 2000, New York became the first state to enter the
legal fray against gun makers.53 Numerous individual victims of gun
violence have pending negligence cases against the industry, 54 and the
NAACP and the National Spinal Cord Injury Association have a simi-

52. See Plaintiff's Complaint, City of NewYork v. Arms Tech., Inc. (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (No.
1:00-cv-3641); First Amended Complaint, City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson (Mass. Super.
Ct. 2000) (No. 1999-02590); Plaintiffs Complaint, District of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp. (D.C. Super. Ct. 2000) (No. 00-0000428); Plaintiffs Complaint, People of the State
of California ex rel. Hahn v. Arcadia Machine & Tool (Cal. Super. Ct. 1999) (No.
BC210894); Plaintiffs Complaint, People of the State of California ex rel. Renne v. Arcadia
Machine & Tool (Cal. Super. Ct. 1999) (No. 303753); Plaintiffs Complaint, City of St.
Louis v. Cernicek (Mo. Cir. Ct. 1999) (No. 992-01209); Plaintiff's Complaint, City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1999) (No. A9902369); Plaintiff's Complaint,
White v. Hi-Point Firearms (Ohio Ct. of C. P. 1999) (No. 381897); Plaintiffs Complaint,
City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. (I11. Cir. Ct. 1999) (No. 98 CH 015596); Plaintiffs
Complaint, Archer v. Arms Tech., Inc. (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1999) (No. 99-912658); Plaintiff's
Complaint, City of Atlanta v. Smith & Wesson Corp. (Ga. Cty. Ct. 1999) (No.
99VS0149217J); Plaintiffs Complaint, Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp. (La. Dist. Ct. 1998)
(No. 98-18578).
53. See Plaintiffs Complaint, State of New York v. Arms Tech. Inc., No. 1-00-03641-JBW
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
54. See, e.g., Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), petition
for review granted,92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 256 (Cal. 2000); Plaintiffs Complaint, Anderson v. Bryco,
No. 00 L 7476 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2000); First Amended Complaint, Ceriale v. Smith & Wesson
Corp., No. 99 L 5628 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1999). Authors represent a large number of the individuals, cities and municipalities suing the gun industry. For a complete list of these cases, see
<http://www.gunlawsuits.org/docket/index.asp>.
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lar case seeking injunctive relief to reform the industry's distribution
practices.55
The legal issue posed by the negligent distribution cases is:
Should gun makers be liable for their failure to take reasonable steps
to prevent guns from arming criminals and minors when those per-

sons then use those guns in crime? Or should gun makers be allowed
to profit from their unreasonably dangerous conduct without paying
any of the resulting costs, which are now borne by innocent victims?
The plaintiffs in these cases view this question as a relatively simple one. They think that gun makers, like all others who engage in
conduct that exposes others to a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm,
should be held liable for the damage caused by their failure to use
reasonable care to minimize that risk. Ajury could find that a reasonable business, under the circumstances faced by gun makers, would
take steps to prevent prohibited purchasers from obtaining guns.56 In
order to save lives, reasonable businesses would sacrifice some profits
for the sales that will foreseeably arm criminals and youths. As a society we should not reward businesses that sacrifice the public's safety
for their own profits.
Gun manufacturers vigorously contest these conclusions. One of
their principal arguments is that they do not owe a duty of care to the
plaintiffs and cannot be held liable under negligence law in the absence of a "special relationship" with plaintiffs or the individuals who
used negligently distributed guns to injure the plaintiffs.
A.

The "Special Relationship" Rule

An examination of the "special relationship" rule and its history
clearly demonstrates its inapplicability to gun distribution cases.
Courts have generally viewed the grounds for imposing liability to be
stronger where the defendant affirmatively acted to cause harm to
others, as opposed to failing to take an action that would have protected others from injury. When a defendant engages in misfeasance,
she is held to owe a general duty of care to all who might foreseeably
be injured by her actions. 5 7 When an action is characterized as nonfeasance, the defendant is held to owe no duty of care to prevent inju55. See Plaintiffs Complaint, National Asso'n for the Advancement of Colored People
v. A.A. Arms, Inc. (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (No. 99CV3999).
56. Indeed, at least one court has found that because it was so foreseeable that others
would use an individual's guns in crimes, the gun owner was subject to an enhanced criminal sentence as a result of those third party crimes. See United States v. Gilmore, 60 F.3d
392, 393-94 (7th Cir. 1995).
57. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
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ries to others absent one of a limited number of "special
relationships" that obligate her to act for the protection of the
plaintiff.5 8
Courts have distinguished between active perpetration of an injury (misfeasance) and passive inaction in the face of possible injury
to others (nonfeasance) since the fifteenth century. 59 Loath to convert the courts into an agency for forcing men to help one another6 °
and fearful of imposing an amorphous, unworkable duty on an indefinite number of bystanders, 6 1 the common law refused to impose liability on the man who could easily stop the blind woman from
stepping off the pier or the store owner who, by complying with a
robber's request, could forestall injury to a customer. 2 In the words
of Benjamin Cardozo, then a judge on the New York Court of Appeals, the difference is that between "merely withholding a benefit"
and "positively or actively ... working an injury."63 The law "does not
compel active benevolence between man and man,"64 but it does demand that acts, once undertaken, be prosecuted with care.
The clearest application of this theoretical distinction, and the
paradigmatic case of nonfeasance, is the rule that one generally has
no duty to aid another.6 5 Commentators have long lamented the
moral and ethical difficulties engendered by this "no duty to rescue"
rule, 66 and a few states have enacted statutes imposing a duty, under
58. See infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
59. See Jean Rowe & Theodore Silver, TheJurisprudenceof Action and Inaction in the Law
of Tort: Solving the Puzzle of Nonfeasance and Misfeasancefrom the Fifteenth Through the Twentieth
Centuries, 33 DuQ. L. REV. 807 (1995).
60. See LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 62 (1930).
61. See Robert Lipkin, Beyond Good Samaritans and Moral Monsters: An IndividualisticJustification of the General Legal Duty to Rescue, 31 UCLA L. REv. 252, 267-74 (1983) (noting that
practical difficulties involved in proving negative causation, identifying the specific
tortfeasor, and demonstrating that the alleged tortfeasor had prior knowledge of what was
legally required have led courts to reject a general duty to rescue).
62. See, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken of Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court, 927 P.2d 1260,
1269 (Cal. 1997) ("no duty to comply with a robber's unlawful demands should be imposed on a shop-keeper.").
63. H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898 (N.Y. 1928). See also
Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REv.
217, 220-21 (1908) (distinguishing between acts that create "a minus quantity, a positive
loss" and those that create a loss "only in the sense of an absence of a plus quantity");
LAWRENCE H. ELDRIDGE, MODERN TORT PROBLEMS 13 (1941) ("The man who is guilty of a
misfeasance makes the other's condition worse than it was before, while the man who is
guilty of a nonfeasance does not worsen the other's condition.").
64. James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REv. 97, 112 (1908).
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
66. See, e.g., John M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers:Some Observations
about the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 1991 Wis. L.
REv. 867 (suggesting that courts always impose a reasonableness standard); Steven J. Hey-
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limited circumstances, to aid another in peril.6 7 Nonetheless, under
the common law, courts held that an expert swimmer need not save a
drowning child,6 8 a passerby with medical skills need not bind up the
wounds of a stranger who is bleeding to death,6 9 and an aunt need not
warn her nephew about a defective lawn mower seat.7 ° Absent an affirmative act that increased the risk of harm to the injured party, there
was no liability.7 1
A close cousin to the "no duty to rescue" principle was the old
rule that one generally need not control the conduct of a third person
to prevent him from causing harm to another.7 2 This was true even if
"the actor realize [d] that he has the ability to control the conduct of a
third person, and could do so with only the most trivial of efforts and
without any inconvenience to himself."7 " Thus courts held that a woman was not liable for her husband's shooting spree,7 a halfway
house was not responsible for a tenant's criminal activities,75 and a
restaurant had no duty to protect its patrons from assailants in the
parking lot.76 Once again, the law would not force action where none
had been undertaken.
The law was not entirely callous, however; custom, public sentiment, and social policy considerations carved out "special relationships" in which action was required. One of the earliest and most
basic special relationships was that between property owners and their
invitees. 77 Either because of the potential economic gain to the business owner or an implied representation to the invitee that the

man, Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV. 673, 738-40 (1994) (developing a
liberal-communitarian theory for imposing a duty to rescue).
67. Vermont, Minnesota, and Rhode Island have all enacted "easy rescue" statutes. See
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 1999); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-56-1 (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS

§ 31-26-3 (1994); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-27.1 (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1968).
68. See Handiboe v. McCarthy, 151 S.E.2d 905, 907 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966). See generally
KEETON, supra note 10, § 56, at 375-76.
69. SeeAllen v. Hixson, 36 S.E. 810, 810 (Ga. 1900). See generally KEETON, supra note 10,
§ 56, at 375-76.
70. See Chastain v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 275 S.E.2d 679, 681 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980). See
generally KEETON, supra note 10, § 56, at 375-76 (discussing decisions "revolting to any
moral sense.").
71. See generally Ames, supra note 64, at 111.
72. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 315.

73. Id. at cmt. b.
74. See Newton v. Tinsley, 970 S.W.2d 490, 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
75. See generally Bailor v. Salvation Army, 854 F. Supp. 1341, 1365 (N.D. Ind. 1994),
affd, 51 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 1995).
76. See Saccuzzo v. Krystal Co., 646 So. 2d 595, 597 (Ala. 1994).
77. See KEETON, supra note 10, § 61, at 419.
78. See id. at 420.
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premises would be made safe for his occupation,7" a landowner was
deemed to owe invitees "an affirmative duty to protect them, not only
against dangers of which he knows, but also against those which with
reasonable care he might discover."8 Under old common law nonfeasance principles, this duty did not extend beyond invitees. Trespassers and licensees were expected to look out for themselves; the
property owner need neither warn them of nor protect them from
81
even foreseeable danger.
Beyond landowners and occupiers, other special relationships
have included
common carriers and passengers,8 2 innkeepers and
guests,8 3 parents and children, 4 and psychotherapists and patients.85
In general, special relationship exceptions to the no-duty rule have
been based on control and impose on a defendant an initial duty to
protect or aid a vulnerable, dependent plaintiff or restrain a third
party bent on doing harm.8 6 The list of special relationships continues to expand and depends on "a variety of factors not yet fully defined,"8 7 which vary from state to state. In all cases, the degree of care
required is not Herculean; a person is merely required to act reasonably under the circumstances.8 8
At the other end of the spectrum sits strict liability, under which
certain activities are so likely to result in injury to others that those
who engage in them are always liable for the injuries that result.8 9
Since the English case of Fletcher v. Rylands,9 ° the common law recognized that some activities are so dangerous that those who engage in
them ought to be liable to those harmed by them, irrespective of the
79. See id. at 422.
80. Id. at 419.
81. See id. at 412. See alsoAdams v. Ferraro, 339 N.Y.S.2d 554, 555 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973)
(per curiam) (holding that tavern was not liable to man who slipped on ice in parking lot
because he was only going to the tavern to look for a relative). Although many jurisdictions have held on to these distinctions, following the California Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968), this arbitrary and
confusing sliding scale has begun to be superceded by a single reasonableness standard.
82. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 314A(1).
83. See id. at § 314A(2).
84. See id. at § 314A(4).
85. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
86. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 314A, § 315(a), (b); Lipkin, supra note 61, at 264
(suggesting that a duty to rescue arises from the ability of the defendant and the dependency of the plaintiff).
87. Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified Sch. Dist., 230 Cal. Rptr. 823, 826 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986).
88. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 314A, cmt. e.
89. See infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
90. L.R. I Ex. 265 (1866), affd, Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
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level of care exercised.9" Those whose artificial reservoirs flood their
neighbor's coal mine, 2 whose dynamite blasting injures a pedestrian
on the highway," whose oil wells blow out and spew sludge on neighboring land,9 4 and whose fuel rockets destroy another's well95 bear
complete responsibility for the destruction wrought by their activities.9 6 In such cases, the landowner who conducts an ultrahazardous
activity on her land was deemed to owe an absolute duty to protect
against harm, regardless of her relationship to the injured party or the
9 7
care she took to prevent injury from occurring.
Between no duty and strict liability sits misfeasance, under which
liability is imposed for failure to exercise reasonable care.98 At the
simplest level, misfeasance involves positive action that creates a foreseeable risk of harm to a person who is then injured. 99 In such cases,
a general duty to avoid causing injury is assumed,' 0 0 and the courts
progress to the other required elements of negligence, i.e., breach,
causation, and damage. ° 1 When, for example, a man fires his gun on
the streets and injures someone, no one asks whether he had a special
relationship with the victim. By wielding a gun, one places others at
risk and so owes potential victims a duty to use reasonable care not to
02
injure them.1

91. See id. at 299.
92. See id.
93. See Sullivan v. Dunham, 55 N.E. 923 (N.Y. 1900).
94. See Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 270 P. 952 (Cal. 1928).
95. See Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
96. See Sullivan, 55 N.E. at 923; Green, 270 P. at 952; Smith, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
97. In a spate of cases filed in the 1980s, which are wholly different from the current
city lawsuits against gun manufacturers, some victims of gun violence contended that the
business of selling handguns - particularly "Saturday Night Specials" - that were likely to
end up in the hands of (and may have been intended for) criminals posed such a great risk
of danger to society that those who engage in it should be strictly liable for the costs of the
harm that resulted, rather than innocent victims. See, e.g., Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 843 F.2d
406 (10th Cir. 1988); King v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 451 N.W.2d 874 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990);
Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758 (D.C. 1989). This theory was generally rejected by
the courts, though one court did accept it in part. See Kelly v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d
1143 (Md. 1985). The current crop of gun distribution cases expressly discards the absolute liability theories of these prior cases and instead seeks to impose liability for gun makers' failure to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.
98. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 314A, cmt. f.
99. See id.
100. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 818 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("In the usual
run of cases, a general duty to avoid negligence is assumed, and there is no need for the
court to undertake detailed analysis of precedent and policy.").
101. See id. at 827.
102. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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Misfeasance encompasses more than the obvious. Actions that in0 3
crease the risk that others will cause harm also engender a duty.'
Such "risk facilitation" or "enabling" is as much misfeasance as is the
wielding of a gun.'0 4 This concept of enabling forms the basis of liability for the kindly old lady who buys her alcoholic, drug-addicted,
license-less grand-nephew a new car' 0 5 and the train conductor who
0 6
carelessly abandons a young woman at night in Hoboes' Hollow.1
Acts that, in other situations, may be perfectly harmless, even laudable, enter the realm of misfeasance when they "enhance the risk that a
malevolent or consciously indifferent intervenor will seriously injure
an innocent third party.' 07
B.

Courts That Have Ruled in Favor of the Gun Manufacturers on the
"Special Relationship" Issue

In the past year, state trial judges in Michigan, Ohio, and Florida
dismissed negligence claims against gun manufacturers and distributors for lack of a duty to control the conduct of criminal third parties.'1 8
Instead of focusing on the gun manufacturers' and
distributors' positive contributions to the harm, the judges mischaracterized their behavior as nonfeasance and dismissed the cases
for lack of any special relationships.' ° 9 These courts dismissed plaintiffs' cases on the pleadings, holding that even if the allegations were
true that gun manufacturers knew that their conduct continually endangered the public and that manufacturers could feasibly prevent
much criminal possession, they could not be liable because they had

103. See Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 442 (1999) (discussing
the expansion of the enabling tort concept); Rowe & Silver, supra note 59, at 854 (explaining that a duty arises if "it may be said that absent the defendant's existence, the risk
through which plaintiff was injured would not have arisen.").
104. See Rabin, supra note 103, at 437, 439.
105. See Vince v. Wilson, 561 A.2d 103, 104 (Vt. 1989) (finding that grand-aunt had a
duty to victim of grand-nephew's reckless driving because she bought him a car in full
knowledge of his dubious driving credentials).
106. See Hines v. Garrett, 108 S.E. 690, 695 (Va. 1921) (holding that train motorman was
liable for rape of female passenger after he took her beyond her stop and she was forced to
walk back through dangerous area). See also Rabin, supra note 103, at 440 (identifying "key
in the ignition" cases as another example of an enabling tort).
107. Rabin, supra note 103, at 443.
108. See Archer v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-912658 NZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. May 16, 2000);
City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A.Corp., 1999 WL 809838 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Oct. 7, 1999),
affid, 2000 WL 1133078 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2000), appeal allowed, 740 N.E.2d 1111
(Ohio 2001). See also Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., 1999 WL 1204353 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13,
1999), afftd, 2001 WL 120529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2001), cert. denied (Mar. 21, 2001)
(dismissing negligent design claim against gun manufacturers for lack of duty).
109. See Archer, No. 99-912658 NZ, slip op. at 6; Cincinnati, 1999 WtL 809838, at *2.
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no special relationship with the victims." ° Disregarding precedent in
which gun sellers were held liable for shootings where their negligence enabled the shooters to obtain the gun, these courts seem to
have ignored the affirmative steps taken by gun manufacturers that
increased the risk of harm to the victims and treated the plaintiffs'
cases as requesting gun makers to rescue victims from the clutches of
gun-toting criminals. Comparing the allegations of plaintiffs with the
courts' opinions, it appears that the two were speaking past each
other, with the courts assuming the claims concerned only nonfeasance when in fact, the plaintiffs alleged otherwise. Although these
cases are not the only instances in which judges have erroneously categorized the gun manufacturers' and distributors' conduct as nonfeasance,"' they provide a good basis for examination.
In 1999, Wayne County and the City of Detroit filed suit against
gun manufacturers and distributors for public nuisance and negligent
marketing and distribution of guns."' Although the court upheld the
public nuisance claim,"' it dismissed the municipalities' negligence
action." 4 In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants employed a policy of active encouragement and willful blindness
to facilitate the creation of an illegal secondary market in firearms." 5
Straw purchases, multiple sales, sales to minors, and diversion of guns
to felons and other unauthorized purchasers were not only encouraged but exploited and relied upon as a vital source of revenue,
according to the plaintiffs.'1 6 As a result, the plaintiffs'- complaint alleged, thousands of firearms were put into the hands of criminals,
juveniles, and other dangerous people for the commission of
crimes."7
The court found that notwithstanding these facts, gun manufacturers did not owe a duty to use reasonable care to prevent foreseeable injuries caused by their distribution." 8 Instead, the court
focused on the defendants' duty to protect the victims or restrain the
criminals; in spite of the plaintiffs' clear misfeasance allegations, the
110. See Archer, No. 99-912658 NZ, slip op. at 4; Cincinnati, 1999 WL 809838, at *2.
111. See, e.g., Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 469 N.E.2d 339, 340 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
112. Archer v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-912658 NZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1999); McNamara v.
Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-912662 NZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1999).
113. See id. at 12.
114. See id. at 6.
115. See Plaintiff's Complaint, Archer, No. 99-912658 NZ, 2 (Apr. 26, 1999).
116. See id. 4.
117. See id. 2.
118. See Archer v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-912658 NZ, slip op. at 7 (Mich. Cir. Ct. May
16, 2000).
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court analyzed the issue as if it were a nonfeasance case."

9

After stat-

ing,"I[i]t is well accepted that there is no duty to protect another per-

son from the criminal acts of a third party in absence of special
circumstances," the judge relied on two nonfeasance cases to dismiss

the plaintiffs' negligence action.1 20 The first, Williams v. Cunningham
Drug Stores, Inc., 121 addressed the scope of the special relationship between landowners and invitees. 122 In Williams, a drug store security
guard called in sick, and the store owner failed to replace him. 123 An
armed robbery occurred later that day, and, in the ensuing panic, one
of the customers was shot. 1 24 After establishing that merchants owe
their customers a duty to exercise reasonable care for their protection, the court held that such a duty "does not include providing
armed, visible security guards to deter criminal acts of third
parties.121

The second case, Murdock v. Higgins,1 26 examined the duty of a
supervisor to investigate and report suspected misbehavior.127 In Murdock, a young Department of Social Services volunteer was sexually as1 28
saulted at the home of his manager while on a voluntary social visit.

At his previous department location, the manager had been suspected
of sexual misconduct with young boys; however, no formal complaint
was ever filed.129 The volunteer sued the former supervisor for failing
to properly investigate the manager's activities or disclose his suspicions to the new department. 30 The Murdock court found no special
relationship between the supervisor and the victim,'
and the relationship between the supervisor and the manager was held not to include a "duty to disclose for intradepartmental or intracompany
32
transfers."1
Neither of these cases should govern the issue of the gun manufacturers' and distributors' negligence. In analogizing from these

nonfeasance cases, the Archer court failed to recognize the fundamen119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See id. at 4-7.
Id. at 4.
418 N.W.2d 381 (Mich. 1988).
See id. at 383.
See id. at 382.
See id.
Id. at 384.
559 N.W.2d 639 (Mich. 1997).
See id. at 643-44.
See id. at 641.
See id. at 642.
See id.
See id. at 643.
Id. at 644.
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tal difference between idly bystanding, merely allowing an injury to
occur, and actively increasing the risk of harm to others. Selling aspirin and toothpaste does not increase the risk of an armed robbery. 3
Supervising a community service employee does not increase the risk
of a sexual assault in that employee's home.' 3 4 On the other hand,
distributing guns into a supply network rife with unscrupulous dealers, gun traffickers, and straw purchasers who fuel the criminal gun

market, affirmatively increases the risk of harm to society in a way that
the inaction of the defendants in the cited cases did not.
The City of Cincinnati'3 5 decision followed a similar erroneous
line of reasoning. The plaintiffs in City of Cincinnatialso alleged that
gun manufacturers and distributors negligently distributed and marketed their products.' 3 6 The trial court disregarded precedent in
which Ohio courts recognized that the grave foreseeable danger
posed by guns warrants the imposition of a duty to prevent them from
falling into the wrong hands."t 7 The Ohio Court of Appeals had held
that a gun show operator could be liable for a criminal shooting by
teenagers using a gun they stole from a dealer at the show on the
theory that the operator negligently failed to prevent minors from entering the show and negligently failed to require dealers at the show
to take appropriate security measures to prevent thefts.1 38 The Ohio
Supreme Court had held that a gun owner could be liable for a shooting where she negligently failed to prevent her son from obtaining the
gun, and he then gave it to a young friend, who accidentally shot the
plaintiff.1" 9 In neither case did the court deem that a "special relationship" was needed in order to impose liability for another's criminal or negligent act; the potential danger of guns in the wrong hands
was sufficient to warrant a duty. t4 °
Notwithstanding this precedent, the trial court found the gun
negligence cases less relevant than two landowner liability cases,
42
4
Gelbman v. Second NationalBank ' and Simpson v. Big Bear Stores Co.,'
133. See supra text accompanying notes 122-125 (discussing the duty a merchant owes
customers).

134. See supra text accompanying notes 126-132 (discussing the duty of a supervisor to
report an employee's suspected misbehavior).
135. See City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 1999 WL 809838 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Oct.
7, 1999).
136. See id. at *2.
137. See Pavlides v. Niles Gun Show, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 728 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
138. See id. at 731.
139. See Taylor v. Webster, 231 N.E.2d 870, 872 (Ohio 1967).
140. See id.; see also Pavlides, 679 N.E. at 731.
141. 458 N.E.2d 1262 (Ohio 1984).
142. 652 N.E.2d 702 (Ohio 1995).
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which it cited for the proposition that "under Ohio law, in order to
hold a defendant liable in negligence for the criminal conduct of a
third party, the defendant must owe a duty arising out of a special
relationship which requires the defendant to protect the plaintiff." 4 3
Like the Michigan trial court, the Cincinnati trial court failed to
appreciate that the defendants in the "special relationship" cases did
not engage in conduct that increased the risk of harm.' 4 4 Rather, the
cases relied upon by the court were nonfeasance cases that turned on
whether the duty imposed on a landowner due to his special relationship with invitees extends to those outside the landowner's property.' 4 5 Gelbman held that a property owner did not owe a duty to
third parties to prevent injury caused by business invitees outside of
their premises; specifically, a plaintiff whose car was struck by a car
exiting a Burger King parking lot could not recover against Burger
King for injuries suffered in an accident upon leaving the lot.146 Similarly, Simpson held that while a property owner (there, a supermarket)
owes a duty to keep its premises safe for invitees, a responsibility that
includes protection from foreseeable criminal 47attacks, it has no such
duty to protect customers off of its premises. 1
The difference between the landowner cases relied on by the
court and the negligent distribution cases should be obvious. By selling hamburgers or groceries, one does not expose persons to an increased risk of being injured by a driver or a criminal when one leaves
the store. Any duty to protect patrons from such injuries is properly
limited to property within the business's control. If, on the other
hand, Burger King sold tainted meat in a hamburger that a customer
did not eat until he had driven across the country, Burger King would
properly be liable for food poisoning even though it occurred off the
premises. The risk of food poisoning is one created by the selling of
burgers, and it is a risk that travels as far as customers take their
burgers. So too, the risk posed by carelessly-distributed guns is not
limited to certain locations or classes of persons; all are exposed to it.
A state trial court in Florida dismissed Miami-Dade County's negligent design claim against gun manufacturers using similar reasoning. 4 ' Although that case focused on the failure to use reasonable
care in design rather than in the distribution of guns, the legal error
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
See
See
See
See
See

at 705; see also Gelbman, 458 N.E.2d at 1262, 1263.
supra text accompanying notes 135-137.
supra notes 141-143 and accompanying text.
Gelbman, 458 N.E.2d at 1264.
Simpson, 652 N.E.2d at 705.
Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., 1999 WL 1204353, at *2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1999).
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was the same. The court held that "Florida law does not impose a duty
on a defendant to protect others from the criminal and reckless behavior of a third person unless there is a special relationship between
the defendant and the plaintiff and the third person."' 4 9 The Penelas
court refused to follow a long line of Florida cases in which gun sellers
who negligently enabled an irresponsible person to obtain a gun were
held liable for shootings,15 0 even when the dealer sold the gun to an
irresponsible person who was not himself the shooter.1 5 Instead, the
court relied on precedent limiting liability of persons who fail to control the criminal conduct of another. 15 2 Again, the court looked to
nonfeasance cases in which the defendant did not engage in conduct
that exposed others to risks beyond those inherent in society.
By characterizing the gun manufacturers' and distributors' conduct as failure to prevent harm rather than creating risk of harm by
actively distributing dangerous products in a manner that supplies illegal markets, these courts misperceived the nature of the municipalities' allegations. 5 The precedent relied upon by the court only
resembles negligent gun distribution claims to the extent that both
seek to impose liability for third party criminal conduct. 1 54 However,
the cited cases were wholly inapposite in that they did not involve conduct by a defendant that caused great foreseeable (and preventable)
dangers to others. 155 Gun manufacturers' negligent distribution
should more properly be classified as misfeasance - affirmatively exposing the public to foreseeable risks of injury.

149. See id. at *3.
150. See, e.g., Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp., 697 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1997); Tamiami Gun Shop
v. Klein, 116 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1959) (holding a gun dealer liable for accidental shooting);
Sogo v. Garcia's Nat'l Gun, Inc., 615 So. 2d 184 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing summary judgment for gun dealer who delivered gun, without waiting three days as law required, to man who committed suicide with it later that day); Angell v. F. Avanzini Lumber
Co., 363 So. 2d 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (reversing dismissal where gun dealer sold
rifle to woman who was acting strangely and then killed a man).
151. See K-Mart Enters. of Florida, Inc. v. Keller, 439 So. 2d 283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983), review denied, 450 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1984).
152. See Lighthouse Mission of Orlando, Inc. v. Estate of McGowen, 683 So. 2d 1086
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Austin v. Mylander, 717 So. 2d 1073, 1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
153. See supra note 52.
154. See supra notes 150-152 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 150-152 and accompanying text.
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C.

Courts That Have Ruled in Favor of Plaintffs on the
"Special Relationship" Issue

Other courts have agreed with this view in a series of key decisions. 56
' In Hamilton v. Accu-Tek,' 5 7 a federaljury returned a verdict in
favor of criminal shooting victims and their families on negligent distribution claims against several major handgun manufacturers.'s In
denying a motion to overturn the verdict, the trial court (Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York) held that the manufacturers
owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs under New York negligence law
and could be held legally responsible for criminal shootings resulting
from their breach of that duty.' 5 9 The court described the duty as
requiring the manufacturers "to exercise reasonable care in marketing and distributing their products so as to guard against the risk of
[their] criminal misuse."1 6 ° The court explained that:
[i]t is the duty of manufacturers of a uniquely hazardous
product, designed to kill and wound human beings, to take
reasonable steps available at the point of their sale to primary distributors to reduce the possibility that these instruments will fall into the hands of those likely to misuse
them. 161
The Hamilton court held that the gun manufacturers not only created
a risk of foreseeable harm to the plaintiffs but also had the ability to
avoid doing so by changing the manner in which they distributed
their products.' 6 2 This decision recognizes that the manufacturers
had an "ongoing close relationship with downstream distributors and
retailers putting new guns into consumers' hands [and] provided
them with appreciable control over the ultimate use of their products."' 6 3 The court held that the evidence supported the jury's find-

156. See, e.g, City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 2000 WL 1473568, at *15 (Mass.
Super. Ct. July 13, 2000) (finding that gun manufacturers owed a basic duty not to create
an illegal, secondary firearms market); Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 185
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a gun manufacturer has a duty "not to increase the risk
inherently presented by the assault weapon it manufactures, markets and distributes"), review granted, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 256 (Cal. 2000).
157. 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), questions certified, 222 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2000),
certified questions accepted, 95 N.Y.2d 878 (N.Y. 2000).
158. See id. at 808.
159. See id. at 827, 832-33.
160. Id. at 824.
161. Id. at 825.
162. See id. at 839.
163. Id. at 820.
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ings that criminal misuse of guns was foreseeable, and that defendants
1 64
had failed to take reasonable steps to prevent it.
Other courts have recognized a duty under analogous circumstances, where plaintiffs alleged specific acts of negligence on the part
of gun makers that increased the risk of criminal misuse. 165 In Merrill
v. Navegar, Inc.,' 6 6 the Court of Appeal of California found that a gun
manufacturer "owed appellants a duty to exercise reasonable care not
to create risks above and beyond those inherent in the presence of
firearms in our society."' 6 7 Reversing the trial court's summary judgment ruling that gun makers did not owe a duty of care to the victims
of a shooting, the Court of Appeal held that a gun maker's negligent
conduct in manufacturing, distributing, and marketing to the general
public a high-capacity, rapid-fire, military-style assault weapon,
uniquely suited for mass shootings and lacking legitimate civilian uses,
could make it liable for a 1994 assault at the offices of the Pettit &
Martin law firm at 101 California Street in San Francisco, in which a
former client fatally shot eight people and seriously wounded six
others in a matter of minutes.1 68 The defendant, Navegar, Inc., designed, distributed, and marketed the TEC-9, an assault pistol so inimical to the public's health and safety that it was banned by the
California Legislature prior to the shooting and later by the U.S. Congress."' Among other things, the evidence showed that Navegar:
* designed the TEC-9 to be perfectly suited for rapidly killing
people at short-range in military-style assaults but to be unsuited for any legitimate civilian sporting, defensive, or other
use;
• aggressively promoted its military features and unsurpassed
firepower;
" included features on the TEC-9 of great interest to criminals,
such as a threaded barrel for silencers or flash suppressers;
" marketed the gun as being "tough as your toughest customer"
and having an "excellent resistance to fingerprints," thereby
specifically inviting criminal interest in and use of the gun;
164. See id. at 839.
165. See City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 2000 WL 1473568, at *15 (Mass. Super.
Ct. July 13, 2000); White v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 828-29 (N.D. Ohio
2000).
166. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) review granted, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 256 (Cal.
2000).
167. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152.
168. See id. at 152, 154-55.
169. See id. at 152 n.3, 153 n.5.
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" welcomed news of high-profile mass killings with the TEC-9 as
having "advertising tingle" because, according to Navegar, "anything bad would be good" for sales; and
" exploited the TEC-9's appeal to criminals by highlighting legislative efforts to ban it, while changing the gun's name to dodge
such bans and potential civil liability.1 7 °
The Court of Appeal held that California tort law places limits on
the manner in which a gun manufacturer, like anyone else, conducts
its activities.1 71 It ruled that Navegar owed a duty of care to the public,
which was placed at risk by the TEC-9 pistols that Navegar designed,
manufactured, distributed, and marketed to the public. 172 Rejecting
Navegar's argument that the plaintiffs needed to show a "special relationship" or "special circumstances" to establish Navegar's duty of
care, the court held that California common law has recognized the
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, requiring a special
relationship or circumstances only in cases involving nonfeasance,
and that Navegar's negligent conduct was misfeasance.17 Navegar designed and widely distributed a weapon uniquely suited for mass killing and lacking legitimate civilian uses and had "substantial reason to
foresee that many of those to whom it made the TEC-DC9 available
would criminally misuse it to kill and injure others," and its "targeted
marketing of the weapon 'invited or enticed' persons likely to so mis1' 74
use the weapon to acquire it."
Some courts in the cases brought by cities and counties have also
ruled that gun manufacturers could be held liable for negligence resulting in a shooting, without regard to the presence of a "special relationship."' 175 Denying a motion to dismiss the claims brought by the
city of Cleveland, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio relied on the same Ohio precedent rejected by the trial court in
Cincinnati to hold that "[a] duty of care for the protection of a plaintiff against an unreasonable risk of injury is owed to all people 'to
whom injury may reasonably be anticipated.' 1 76 A Massachusetts
court also firmly rejected the gun makers' arguments in denying their
170. See id. at 154-57, 162-63.
171. See id. at 168-69.
172. See id. at 185.
173. See id. at 165.
174. Id. at 168-69.
175. See White v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 828 (N.D. Ohio 2000); see
also City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 2000 WL 1473568, at *15 (Mass. Super. Ct.
July 13, 2000).
176. White, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 828 (quoting Gedeon v. East Ohio Gas Co., 190 N.E. 924,
926 (Ohio 1934)). Like the case brought by Miami-Dade, Cleveland's negligence claims
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motion to dismiss a case brought by the city of Boston.' 7 7 While the
defendants in that case insisted that they "did not owe Plaintiffs a duty
to protect from the criminal acts of third parties[,]" the court recognized that this argument misconstrued the complaint because "Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants were negligent for failure to
protect from harm but that defendants engaged in conduct the foreseeable result of which was to cause harm to Plaintiffs. 1 78 The court
explained further that:
Taking Plaintiffs' allegations as true, Defendants have engaged in affirmative acts (i.e., creating an illegal secondary
firearms market) by failing to exercise adequate control over
the distribution of their firearms. Thus it is affirmative conduct that is alleged-the creation of the illegal secondary
firearms market. The method by which Defendants created
this market, it is alleged, is by designing or selling firearms
without regard to the likelihood the firearms would be
placed in the hands ofjuveniles, felons or others not permitted to use firearms in Boston. Further, according to the complaint, Defendants did this knowing that the firearms would
end up in that market, and, depending upon precisely that
result, realizing that Plaintiffs would be harmed. Taken as
true, these facts suffice to allege that Defendants' conduct
unreasonably exposed Plaintiffs to a risk of harm.' 79
As these courts have recognized, gun manufacturers' conduct in
distributing guns exposes the public to foreseeable danger, and the
duty of gun manufacturers to responsibly distribute their products is
firmly rooted in misfeasance, rather than in nonfeasance.
III.

THE CASE FOR REPLACING THE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" RULE

WITH

A MORE

FLEXIBLE AND FAIR ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs should be able to prevail on negligent distribution
claims against gun manufacturers under the traditional analysis, and
the weight of authority is growing in favor of that conclusion. 8
addressed only the negligent design of guns rather than their negligent distribution. See
Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., 1999 WIL 1204353, at *3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1999).
177. See Boston, 2000 'AL 1473568, at *15.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 824 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding
gun manufacturers have a duty to exercise reasonable care in marketing and distributing
to guard against the risk of criminal misuse), questions certified, 222 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2000),
certfied questions accepted, 95 N.Y.2d 878 (N.Y. 2000); Boston, 2000 NAIL 1473568, at *15 (finding that gun manufacturers owed a basic duty not to create an illegal secondary market);
Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that the
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Nonetheless, the split of authority in these cases indicates that the
traditional approach can produce inconsistent results)'
While the
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance is clear in theory,
"in practice it is not always easy to draw the line and say whether conduct is active or passive."18 2 At some level, the difference between misfeasance and nonfeasance can appear to be only semantic. For
example, an automobile collision can be described as misfeasance
(the driver actively drove into the rear-end of another car) or nonfeasance (the driver merely failed to apply the brakes). In the gun cases,
the manufacturers attempt a similar semantic slight of hand by characterizing the issue as whether they can be held liable for failing to prevent crimes or to protect plaintiffs from harm, rather than whether
they should be liable for the irresponsible distribution of their lethal
products.18 3
Courts should be able to apply these concepts properly and to
distinguish a defendant whose conduct created or increased a risk of
harm to the plaintiff from a defendant who merely failed to benefit
the plaintiff by coming to his aid. However, as is evident from the
cases discussed above, the stakes are high if error in applying these
concepts is made. Under the special relationship regime, distinguishing between misfeasance and nonfeasance is all-important.1 8 4 That
approach allows defendants to obtain a virtually complete exemption
from liability for the harm resulting from their negligent distribution
if they win the semantic game and can convince courts to characterize
the claims against them as concerning nonfeasance, as the gun manu85
facturers have managed to do in several cases.'
Moreover, the "special relationship" rule is a poor way of defining
duties of care even for those cases that unmistakably concern only
pure nonfeasance, particularly if courts decide what constitutes a "special relationship" by looking to an arbitrary and outdated set of classifications made by courts in decades or centuries past. For example,
applying the "special relationship" rule in its most rigid form, courts
must hold that innkeepers owe a duty of care to protect their guests
from harm, but landlords have no such duty toward their tenants, because courts decided long ago under circumstances very different
gun manufacturers had a duty not to create risks), review granted,92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 256 (Cal.
2000).
181. SeeCopier By and Through Lindsey v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833, 837 n.3
(providing examples of the split of authority).
182. KEETON, supra note 10, § 56, at 374.
183. See, e.g., Boston, 2000 WL 1473568, at *15; Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 821.
184. See supra notes 57-107 and accompanying text.
185. See id.
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from today's conditions that innkeeper-guest is a "special relationship" but landlord-tenant is not.186

A more logical and equitable approach would favor retiring the
"special relationship" requirement and applying a more flexible approach to determine the existence or scope of duties of care. Under
this approach, the primary focus of courts would be the degree to
which the defendant created or increased a risk of foreseeable harm
to others and its ability to prevent or to reduce that risk of harm
through reasonable changes in its conduct.1 7 Courts would not be
forced to classify negligent conduct as purely misfeasance or nonfeasance, and the courts' conclusions about whether a defendant owes a
duty of care would not depend entirely on the rigid application of a
limited set of "special relationships," if the court deems the negligence to be more in the nature of nonfeasance than misfeasance.'
Rather, a defendant whose business or conduct increased the risk of
harm to the public would owe a duty to use reasonable care to minimize those risks, even if its conduct could be deemed as
89
nonfeasance.'
Many courts across the country already have begun to develop
and apply this form of analysis to duty issues, though others have adhered to the traditional version of the "special relationship" rule. 9 °
The approach endorsed here is supported by considerations of public
policy, economic principle, legal theory, and legal precedent.
A.

The Public Policy Justifications: Gun Manufacturers Can Avoid
Causing Harm to Others by Exercising Reasonable Care and
Responsibility in DistributingTheir Products

A more flexible approach to analyzing issues of duty under negligence law, simultaneously more sophisticated and common-sense
186. See infra note 78-80 and accompanying text.
187. See generally Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 161-69 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999), review granted, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 256 (Cal. 2000).
188. Id. at 164.
189. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 824-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), questions
certified, 222 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2000), certified questions accepted, 95 N.Y.2d 878 (N.Y. 2000).
190. Compare Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 827 (finding for criminal shooting victims on
claims of negligent distribution against major handgun manufacturers), and City of Boston
v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 2000 WL 1473568, at *15 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 13, 2000) (denying defendant gun manufacturer's motion to dismiss based on conduct of which harm to
plaintiffs was foreseeable), with Archer v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-912658 NZ , slip op. at 5
(Mich. Cir. Ct. May 16, 2000) (upholding the requirement of a special relationship for
manufacturer liability), and City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A.Corp., 1999 WL 809838, at
*2 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Oct. 7, 1999) (imposing special relationship requirement in denying
plaintiff relief), affd, 2000 WL 1133078 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2000).
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than the traditional analysis, would ensure that gun manufacturers
bear the costs of unreasonable and unnecessary risks of harm they
create by the manner in which they distribute guns. Guns are inherently dangerous weapons designed to kill human beings, which are
sought after and frequently used for exactly that purpose.' 9' Society
has already declared that guns - especially handguns - are too dangerous to be possessed by broad categories of persons, yet illegal gun
possession and illegal sales are rampant.1 92 It should be clear that by
pouring guns into a vast unregulated market, without taking reasonable steps to prevent them from flowing into the criminal market, gun
manufacturers greatly increase the risk that the public will be exposed
to criminal attacks.
The fact that gun manufacturers have made conscious decisions
not to take steps to prevent their guns from flowing into well-known
conduits to the criminal market can be demonstrated not only by the
studies discussed earlier, 9 3 but also through a hypothetical. Suppose
that the only gun makers in America rigorously monitored and supervised their distribution of guns, requiring that all dealers take pains to
prevent guns from falling into criminal hands. The gun makers would
not allow any of their guns to be sold in multiple sales or without
background checks. They would allow only certified, trained persons
to purchase guns, and would take other measures to prevent guns
from being resold to criminals or minors, including refusing to supply
gun dealers who had a history of selling to gun traffickers. Then a
new gun maker opens its doors without any of these restrictions. This
gun maker allows its guns to be sold in any quantity, requires no training of buyers, and makes no attempt to prevent its guns from being
resold in gun shows or on the streets. The new gun maker would, in
short order, provide a ready supply of guns to unscrupulous dealers
and traffickers, leading to the creation of a thriving criminal market.
191. See Nat'l Ctr. for Injury Prevention and Control, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Overall Firearm Deaths and Rates Per 100,000 (last modified July 14, 1999) <http://
www.cdc.gov/ncipc/data/us9794/Ofarm.htm> (reporting that in 1997 there were 32,346
firearm deaths); Nat'l Ctr. for Injury Prevention and Control, CDC, Overall Homicide Deaths
and Rates Per 100,000 (last modified July 14, 1999) <http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/data/
us9794/fhomi.htm> (reporting that in 1997 there were 13,252 homicides); see also PROMISING STRATEGIES, supra note 20, at xiii (articulating the major threat posed by gun violence
to Americans' safety and pointing out 93 daily fatalities and 240 daily injuries from gun
violence).
192. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, GUN DEALER LICENSING & ILLEGAL GUN TRAFFICKING 1
(1997) (noting that "President Clinton has identified the 'ease with which criminals, the
mentally deranged, and even children can acquire firearms' as a major national
problem").
193. See supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text.
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In short, the new gun maker would operate as virtually every gun
maker in America currently does.' 9 4 Should not this new gun maker
bear the costs of the harm it has created?
Gun manufacturers not only create a risk of severe harm, but they
could avoid doing so. As discussed earlier, gun makers have the ability
and power to regulate all of their retailers to prevent them from supplying guns to criminals and juveniles.' 95 In order to prevent suspect
practices and high risk transactions, all gun manufacturers can implement codes or provisions into their distribution agreements similar to,
and more stringent than, Smith & Wesson's, requiring changes in the
way guns are sold.1 96 Recognizing that gun manufacturers owe a duty

of care and can be held liable for breaching that duty will serve to
reduce the supply of guns to unlawful markets and reduce gun violence and the associated costs.
B.

The TheoreticalJustifications:Principles of Economic Efficiency and the
Underlying Premises of Tort Law Require Gun Manufacturers To
Bear the Costs of Their Negligent Distributionof Guns

Gun companies currently enjoy enormous profit from the underground market while bearing none of the costs it imposes on society.
Meanwhile, the economic costs of gun violence, much of it fueled by
the underground market, are staggering. In 1998, there were 30,708
deaths due to firearms, including 12,102 homicides. 9 7 There are at
least three times as many non-fatal shootings.198 According to recent
studies, the average total cost of one gun-related crime can be as high
as $1.79 million, including medical treatment, future living costs, and
the prosecution and imprisonment of the shooter. 199 Most of this cost
is borne by the taxpayer - studies have estimated that the public bears
as much2°as eighty-five percent of the costs associated with gun shot
injuries.
irui.200

194. See Hass Affidavit, supra note 30,
21; Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802.
195. See Haas Affidavit, supra note 30,
17-20.
196. Id. 21.
197. See Nat'l Ctr. for Injury Prevention and Control, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Overall FirearmDeaths and Rates Per 100,000 (last reviewed Aug. 24, 2000) <http://
webapp.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate.html> (reporting that in 1998 there were 30,708
firearm deaths); Nat'l Ctr. for Injury Prevention and Control, Ctrs. for Disease Control and
Prevention, Overall Homicide Deaths and Rates Per 100,000 (last reviewed Aug. 24, 2000)
<http://webapp.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate.html> (reporting that in 1998 there were
12,102 homicides).
198. See Joseph L. Annest et al., National Estimates of Non-Fatal Firearm-RelatedInjuries:
Beyond the Tip of the Iceberg, 273 JAMA 1751 (1995).
199. See Allan Lengel, The Price of Urban Violence, WASH. PosT, Dec. 28, 1997, at B1.
200. See Gunderson, supra note 27, at 483.
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Under the current "special relationship" rubric applied by certain
courts, gun makers profit by maximizing sales to dealers and are exposed to no costs (or threat of criminal sanctions) when those guns
are promptly diverted to prohibited purchasers via the black market. 2

1

Under the current allocation of costs, gun makers have no

duty to distribute their products responsibly and therefore no incentive to do so.2 0 2 The only incentive gun makers have is to sell as many
guns as possible to whomever will buy them. The large multiple sales
of guns to single purchasers that pose such a great risk of supplying
criminals via gun traffickers are, at the same time, financial bonanzas
for gun makers, because they lock up several sales at once. Tort policy
and efficiency arguments support the reversal of these incentives.2 °3
Accepting that "the principal function of accident law is to reduce the
sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents[,]

'2 4
0

tort law should discourage such "socially unreasonable conduct" and
transfer the accident costs from victims and the public to those who
20
can "avoid" them.

5

The current costs associated with the underground gun market
have been improperly allocated. 20 6 Despite the direct link of responsibility between gun manufacturers and the illegal gun market, gun
manufacturers have traditionally escaped any duty to the public to distribute their products in the safest method possible.20 7 When courts
require a "special relationship," gun manufacturers do not suffer penalties when their products are negligently distributed to criminals and
other prohibited purchasers. 20 8 Therefore, gun manufacturers are
not forced to internalize the costs caused by their negligence. Because of this failure to internalize, their products do not reflect the
costs engendered by the underground market they facilitate. 20 9 These
tremendous costs are borne by the public as social expenditures;
201. But see Matt O'Connor, Gun Shop Owner and Clerk Convicted in "Straw" Sales, CI.
TRIB., July 15, 2000, at 5 (recognizing criminal sanctions imposed on gun dealer illegally

selling guns). Importantly, gun manufacturers have not been subjected to criminal sanctions for their willful involvement in this market.
202. See supra notes 118-125 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
204. GuiDo CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 26 (1970).
205. See KEETON, supra note 10, § 1, at 6.
206. The term "costs" used herein is defined as the public social service expenses and
victim expenses associated with the use of guns accessed through the underground market,
which is facilitated by gun manufacturers.
207. See generally supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
208. See generally supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
209. See Guido Calabresi, First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability Systems: Can Economic Analysis of Law Tell Us Anything About Them?, 69 IOWA L. REV. 833, 837-38 (1984).
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Medicaid, emergency service costs, police costs, and the like are un2 10
necessarily high due to the markets' failure to internalize costs.

Gun manufacturers should be'held to a duty to the public and as
a result of such duty should begin to internalize the costs associated
with the negligent sales of their product. The risk that a suspect sale
will likely arm a criminal should not be borne solely by innocent victims or the public. The gun maker who has the power to prevent such
sales - and who profits from them - should also be exposed to risk, for
only if gun makers face countervailing costs for their socially irresponsible conduct will they have an incentive to behave responsibly. By
forcing gun manufacturers to bear the brunt of the costs their negligence imposes on society, gun manufacturers will have an incentive to
distribute their products in a safer manner and the negligent sale of
guns should decrease. With the decrease in negligently sold guns,
fewer juveniles and criminals would have such easy access to guns and
the public social services that have been focused on gun violence can
be freed up for other efforts.
As numerous commentators have noted, "the dominant function
of the fault system is to generate rules of liability that if followed will
bring about, at least approximately, the efficient - the cost-justified level of accidents and safety."2 1' Accordingly, "the negligence system
has been established not to eliminate negligence but to reduce its rate
to some low level while at the same time incentivizing people to minimize the negative consequences of the negligent behavior that still
occurs." 2 1 2 While some argue that the hazardous nature of guns and
21 3
the dangers they pose arguably warrant strict liability treatment,
such is not the approach urged here. Instead, this article accepts
Judge Posner's theory of negligence 21 4 as the applicable paradigm
and proposes the internalization of costs by gun manufacturers.

210. See id (recognizing that when the costs of car accidents are borne by a social insurance system, the cost of driving does not reflect accident costs at all, but the level of general taxation does).
211. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972); see also
CALABRESI, supra note 204, at 17-18 (recognizing that society does not undertake to avoid
accidents at all costs). Importantly, gun makers have not been forced to consider any of
the costs of these accidents as courts have not held them to a reasonable standard of care
in the distribution of their dangerous products.
212. Mark F. Grady, Efficient Negligence, 87 GEO. L.J. 397, 398 (1998).
213. See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products
Liability, 60 Mo. L. REv. 1, 64 (1995) (positing that under a risk-utility analysis, guns could
be treated with strict liability).
214. See generally Posner, supra note 211.
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While some have criticized this theory,2 15 its simplicity best demonstrates that much of the costs society currently undertakes to address
gun violence are inefficient and should be reallocated. This theory of
negligence, as explained by Judge Posner, is founded on the jurisprudence of Judge Learned Hand, specifically his decision in United States
v. Carroll Towing.
Hand was adumbrating, perhaps unwittingly, an economic
meaning of negligence. Discounting (multiplying) the cost
of an accident if it occurs by the probability of occurrence
yields a measure of the economic benefit to be anticipated
from incurring the costs necessary to prevent the accident.
The cost of prevention is what Hand meant by the burden of
taking precautions against the accident ....
If the cost of
safety measures or of curtailment-whichever cost is
lower-exceeds the benefit in accident avoidance to be
gained by incurring that cost, society would be better off, in
economic terms, to forgo accident prevention. 6
This theory, that businesses will implement precautions that are
cheaper than the harm they cause, only works if the costs of harm are
internalized by the cost-avoider - here, those who control the gun distribution network.
Judge Guido Calabresi has refined this "avoidance of cost"
calculus and set forth three sub-goals of the reduction of accident
costs:

1. "[r]eduction of the number and severity of accidents";
2. "[r] educing societal costs resulting from accidents";
3. reducing administration costs or reducing the costs associated
with achieving the first two sub-goals.2 17

215. See Daniel Q. Posin, The Error of the Coase Theorem: Of Judges Hand and Posner and
Carroll Towing, 74 TUL. L. Rrv. 629 (1999) (arguing that the Posner theory of negligence
fails as it is premised upon the Coase theorem, which in turn fails as it does not sufficiently
account for transaction costs); Frank J. Vandall, Judge Posner'sNegligence-Efficiency Theory: A
Critique,35 EMORY L.J. 383 (1986) (arguing that the Posner theory, based on Hand, fails to
account for important values, especially in the personal injury realm).
216. Posner, supra note 211, at 32.
217. C I .ESl,

supra note 204, at 26-28. The current allocation of costs of gun accidents

to social service providers fails to further any of the three sub-goals. There is no reduction
in the number of severity of accidents because gun makers are not held responsible for
their role in the accidents and have no incentive to avoid the accidents. The societal costs
are not reduced as a result and the administrative cost issue is moot, as neither of the other
two sub-goals are achieved.

74

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAw

& POLICY

[VOL. 4:42

Without any common law or statutory duty imposed on gun makers to
products in a safe manner, none of these
distribute their dangerous
18
2
sub-goals are met.

Calabresi recognized two primary methods for obtaining the
2 19 Imposthree sub-goals: general deterrence or specific deterrence.
ing negligence liability on gun manufacturers would employ general
deterrence to address the costs engendered by the underground gun
market. 2 20 Calabresi explains,

[t]he general deterrence approach treats accident costs as it
does any other costs of goods and activities - such as the
metal, or the time it takes, to make cars. If all activities reflect the accident costs they 'cause,' each individual will be
whether an activity is worth the
able to choose for himself
22 1
accident costs it 'causes.'
The individual's choice will allow for the market to determine the acceptable accident level by forcing individuals to consider accident
costs when choosing among activities.22 2 By including accident costs
in the cost of activities, general deterrence reduces accident costs in
two ways: "[t] he first and more obvious one is that it creates incentives
to engage in safer activities ....

The second and perhaps more impor-

accident costs is that it encourtant way general deterrence reduces
223
ages us to make activities safer."
The general deterrence method would force gun manufacturers
to internalize the costs of gun violence caused by their negligence. As
gun makers are not forced to pay the costs of their negligence, the
gun market reflects an artificially low price.2 2 4 For example, a Lorcin
L-25, "one of the guns most frequently traced to violent crime" in the
United States,2 2 5 can be purchased at retail for sixty-nine dollars.2 2 6
218. See id.
219. See id. 68-69.
220. Although a specific deterrence approach, in the form of greater governmental regulation, would also affect cost reduction, the examination of such an approach is beyond
the scope of this article. Instead, in the interest of simplicity, the reallocation of costs will
be discussed only in the context of a general deterrence approach. See id. at 95-129 (examining at length the bases and methods for achieving specific deterrence).
221. Id. at 70.
222. See id. at 69.
223. Id. at 73.
224. See generally Richard C. Ausness, Payingfor the Health Costs of Smoking: Loss Shifting
and Loss Bearing, 27 Sw. U. L. REv. 537 (1998) (examining the arguments for loss shifting
in the tobacco arena and proposing a new loss allocation system).
225. Sharon Walsh, The Cheapest Handgun Was Loaded with Profit, WASH. POST, Aug. 26,
1999, at Al.
226. See id. This same gun costs only ten dollars to make, allowing Lorcin Engineering
Company to reap huge profits. See id.
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Its low price is one of the attributes that makes it so attractive to
criminals; this artificially low price then engenders an artificially high
demand, as the price of guns in no way reflects the dangers guns pose
to society or the costs they generate. 227 This artificially high demand
then results in unnecessarily high levels of deaths, injuries, crimes,
and costs incurred because of guns.2 2 8
By applying the "special relationship" requirement when allocating losses due to gun violence, the courts have failed to allocate to gun
manufacturers any responsibility for negligent marketing. 22 ' This has
generated broad loss spreading by forcing the American public to foot
the bill for much of the costs of the negligently supplied underground
gun market. 23 0 Unfortunately, this loss spreading has not lead to any
reduction in these costs because it is borne entirely by people who
have no ability to reduce those costs. Losses incurred as a result of the
underground market should be placed on those who facilitate the
harm, and who, in Calabresian terms, ought to achieve "primary acci2 31

dent cost avoidance.
Applying Calabresian cost avoidance theories to negligent distribution practices,23 2 it is clear that allocating the costs of negligence to
227. See CALABRES1, supra note 204, at 70 (failure to internalize costs leads consumers to
choose accident-prone activities).
228. See id.
229. See McCarthy v. Olin Corp. 119 F.3d 148, 57 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Archer v. Arms
Tech., Inc., No. 99-912658 NZ, slip op. at 5 (Mich. Cir. Ct. May 16, 2000) (upholding the
requirement of a special relationship for manufacturer liability); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 1999 WL 809838, at *2 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Oct. 7, 1999) (imposing special
relationship requirement in denying plaintiff relief), affd, 2000 WL 1133078 (Ohio Ct.
App. Aug. 11, 2000).
230. See Gunderson, supra note 27, at 483 (estimating 1995 medical costs for firearmrelated injuries at $4 billion, with taxpayers bearing approximately 85% of these costs);
Philip J. Cook et al., The Medical Costs of Gunshot Injuries in the United States, 282 JAMA 447,
453 (1999) (estimating that gunshot injuries in 1994 produced approximately $2.3 billion
in lifetime medical costs, of which $1.1 billion will be paid by U.S. taxpayers).
231. See CALABRESI, supra note 204, at 68.

232. Judge Calabresi applied his economic efficiency theories in his dissent in McCarthy
v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 157-75 (2d Cir. 1997), arguing in favor of certification of duty
questions where the issue was one of first impression. See id. at 157. McCarthy was not a
negligent distribution case, but sought to impose strict liability on the manufacturer of
particularly destructive bullets, and the reasoning is therefore instructive. See id. at 154.
The plaintiffs, family members of those injured or killed by the Long Island Railroad murderer, argued that the manufacturer of the "Black Talon" bullets used in the rampage
should be strictly liable for damages caused by the marketing of an unreasonably dangerous product designed only to do excessive damage to its victims, more severe than that
inflicted by ordinary bullets. See id. at 156. Unlike normal bullets, the Black Talon expands upon impact and blossoms into a claw- like flower, which rips apart the organs of its
victims. See id. at 152. Although the majority found that the bullets were not "defective"
and therefore strict liability was inapplicable, Judge Calabresi argued that so long as the
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gun manufacturers will satisfy several goals of tort law, most importantly, the goal to reduce the amount of harm being suffered.
C.

The PrecedentialJustifications:Courts Have Already Moved Toward
Replacing the "Special Relationship" Rule with a More Flexible
Duty of Care

Recognizing the problems created by the "special relationship"
requirement, courts have already moved toward diminishing their
role in defining the scope of duties under negligence law. 23 3 They
have done so in ways that differ in form but generally achieve the
same ultimate result. Rather than depending on the application of
rigid, traditional categorizations of relationships, the duty of care depends instead on a practical assessment of a number of relevant factors.2 3 4 In particular, the analysis focuses on the extent to which the
defendant participated in creating the risk of harm, the extent to
which the defendant could have foreseen the danger and injury, and
the extent to which the defendant had the ability to eliminate or to
minimize the risk. 23' The trend away from the traditional "special relationship" analysis is apparent both across states in specific types of
cases, and within several states across a broader range of cases. 2 3 6
1.

If Danger is Foreseeable, a Duty Arises: "Key in the Ignition,"
Dram Shop, and ManufacturerDistribution Cases

Numerous courts across the country have dispensed with the special relationship test when determining whether a defendant who
leaves her keys in the ignition owes a duty to a plaintiff injured by the
negligent driving of a third party who steals the car.2 37 Rather than
asking whether the car owner had control over the thief or a protective relationship with the victim, these courts look to the foreseeability
of the danger. 23 8 According to this mode of analysis, a duty arises
benefits of the product are outweighed by its dangerous nature, courts can find the manufacturer strictly liable for the harms caused by the product. See id. at 174.
233. See infra notes 244-250 and accompanying text.
234. See infra notes 237-243.
235. See infra notes 240-243 and accompanying text.
236. See infra notes 277-310 and accompanying text.
237. See infra note 238 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah
1996) (concluding that "because the theft of the car and its negligent operation may have
been foreseeable," a car dealership owed a duty to plaintiffs hit by the driver of a stolen
vehicle); Bell v. Colonial Parking, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 796, 798 (D.D.C. 1992) (finding that a
parking lot owes a duty "if an injury to a person resulting from the collision of a car previously stolen from one of defendant's parking lots was a reasonably foreseeable risk created
by defendant's failure to prevent the theft of that car"); Lavo v. Medlin, 705 S.W.2d 562,
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"where a defendant should reasonably anticipate that its conduct will
create an unreasonably enhanced danger to one in the position of the
injured plaintiff. '23 9 Elements factored into the foreseeability analysis
include the general safety of the area,240 the length of time the car was
left unattended, 241' and the type and size of the vehicle. 24 2 Each case
must be examined on its own facts to determine whether the defendant had a duty in that specific instance to refrain from subjecting the
2 43
plaintiff to a risk of harm.
In applying a foreseeability test, courts have frankly acknowledged that practical considerations, not just abstract principles of legal theory, influence their conclusions: "'The increase of casualties
from traffic accidents is a matter of common knowledge and concern.
The incidence of automobile thefts and damages and injuries resulting from such larcenous escapades has accordingly increased.' "244
In one opinion, the court described in detail the policy justifications for its conclusions, describing a recent nationwide campaign to
reduce auto theft and citing statistics indicating that the accident rate
for stolen cars was approximately two hundred times the normal accident rate, twenty-four percent of stolen cars were involved in acci564 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) ("If it is reasonably foreseeable that an automobile with keys left
in the ignition would be stolen and negligently operated by a thief, then one would have a
duty to protect third parties from this conduct."); Hergenrether v. East, 393 P.2d 164, 167
(Cal. 1964) ("each case must be considered on its own facts to determine whether the joint
effect of them in toto justifies the conclusion that the foreseeable risk of harm imposed is
unreasonable"). See generally David H. Friedland, Negligence: Car Owner Leaving Key in Vehicle
has a Duty to Third Person Injured by Thief 12 UCLA L. REv. 1260, 1261 (1965); Rabin, supra
note 103, at 440-41 (discussing "keys in the ignition" cases as generic example of enabling
tort). Courts often impliedly recognize a duty and analyze foreseeability as an element of
proximate cause. See, e.g., Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 354 So. 2d 54, 55-56 (Fla.
1977); Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc., 106 N.E.2d 395, 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 1952).
239. Cruz, 909 P.2d at 1255.
240. See, e.g., Vining, 354 So. 2d at 56 (rental car lot at airport in high-crime area); Kiste,
106 N.E.2d at 395 (taxicab left on dangerous public street).
241. See, e.g., Palma v. U.S. Indus. Fasteners, Inc., 681 P.2d 893, 902 (Cal. 1984) (truck
left overnight, unlocked, on a lot adjacent to the street, in an industrial city with a transient
population and a high crime rate); Hergenrether,393 P.2d at 167 (two-ton truck left overnight in area populated by drunks).
242. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ham, 285 P.2d 269, 271 (Cal. 1955) (bulldozer); Bicknell v.
Lloyd, 635 S.W.2d 150, 152 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (three-wheeled electric cart that posed a
"continuing temptation to children"). These foreseeability factors are sometimes called
"special" or "unusual" circumstances. See Cruz, 909 P.2d at 1255; Rabin, supra note 103, at
440.
243. See Cruz, 909 P.2d at 1255; Kacena v. George W. Bowers Co., 211 N.E.2d 563, 568
(Ill. App. Ct. 1965).
244. Colonial Parking v. Morley, 391 F.2d 989, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (quoting Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 117 N.E.2d 74, 79 (Il. 1954)); see also Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14, 15
("Everyone knows that children and thieves frequently cause harm by tampering with unlocked cars.").
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dents, eighty-five percent of car thieves in the area did not have
drivers licenses, and nearly sixty percent of car thefts resulted from
motorist neglect, such as leaving keys in the ignition.2 4 5
In addition, courts have noted that their decisions reflect the fundamental underlying concerns of negligence law. 246 Decisions finding a duty to use care when leaving a vehicle unattended impose the
costs of accidents on the people best situated to avoid or to minimize
the costs. 2 4 7 Recognizing that defendants owe a duty of care despite
the absence of a special relationship "puts the burden of the risk, as
far as may be, upon those who create it" and thereby "tends to make
the streets safer" by deterring highly hazardous conduct and preventing harm that can be easily avoided. 24' To the extent costs cannot be
avoided, tort law favors shifting them to the person best able to spread
them. 249 Imposing a duty serves the purpose of "shifting the loss from
the injured victim and his creditors to the vehicle operator who, in
turn, if he chooses, may procure insurance. '"250

Similar considerations have led courts to adopt a foreseeability
test in dram shop liability cases. As with "key in the ignition" cases,
courts have held that bar owners owe a duty of care to third parties
injured by intoxicated customers if the risk of danger is foreseeable.25 1
In finding such a duty, courts are simply applying "the general duty to
exercise reasonable care to avoid foreseeable injury to others.

'25 2

Al-

though at earlier common law, purveyors of alcohol were immune

245. See Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216, 222-23 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
246. See, e.g., id. at 222; Ross, 139 F.2d at 15 (discussing the policy concerns and purpose
of negligence statutes).
247. See supra notes 237-245 and accompanying text.
248. Ross, 139 F.2d at 16.
249. See, e.g., Ausness, supra note 224, at 550-51 ("In the case of product-related injuries,
it's assumed that producers are generally in a better position to spread than consumers...
because producers generally sell their products to a mass market, the incremental cost to
each customer of compensating accident victims is likely to be quite small.").
250. Gaither,404 F.2d at 223.
251. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Merger Enters., Inc., 463 So. 2d 121 (Ala. 1984); Largo Corp.
v. Crespin, 727 P.2d 1098 (Colo. 1986); Klingerman v. Sol Corp., 505 A.2d 474 (Me. 1986);
Young v. Caravan Corp., 663 P.2d 834 (Wash. 1984). See generally El Chico Corp. of Maine
v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 310 n.1 (Tex. 1987) (listing the twenty-nine states that recognize
a common law cause of action against an alcoholic beverage licensee for injuries caused by
an intoxicated customer). In addition to those states that recognize a common law cause
of action, numerous states have enacted civil dram shop liability statutes. See, e.g., 235 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-21 (West 1993) (imposing strict liability on licensed purveyors of
alcohol); see also Poole, 732 S.W.2d at 310 n.2 (listing the nineteen state legislatures who
have enacted such laws).
252. Poole, 732 S.W.2d at 311.
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from liability for the acts of their drunken customers, 211 in recent
years courts have recognized that the devastation wrought by drunk
driving is tragically predictable and eminently avoidable.2 5 4 In the
words of Judge Spears of the Supreme Court of Texas, "[t] he risk and
likelihood of injury from serving alcohol to an intoxicated person
whom the licensee knows will probably drive a car is as readily foreseen as injury resulting from setting loose a live rattlesnake in a shop255
ping mall.
The same and more could be said of the risk and likelihood of
injury from distributing guns in a manner that the manufacturer
knows will likely result in sales to straw purchasers, criminals, and children. The practical considerations and policy concerns that have led
these courts to impose liability on a car owner who leaves her keys in
the ignition and a dram shop that serves intoxicated patrons if danger
is foreseeable, apply even more strongly in the case of gun makers.2 "
In determining whether gun manufacturers and dealers owe a duty,
courts should fashion a foreseeability of danger test that would recognize the affirmative role that gun manufacturers and dealers play in
facilitating gun violence while at the same time imposing liability
where it would serve the deterrent purposes of tort law.
A third example of this general movement toward eliminating arbitrary and unfair results generated by rigid application of the special
relationship requirement has been the recognition that manufacturers should be required to exercise reasonable care in distributing
their products. 2 57 If injured plaintiffs were required to show a traditional special relationship, manufacturers would virtually never be liable for negligent distribution resulting in purchasers using a product
to harm others. Since manufacturers usually distribute through
wholesale and retail intermediaries, they generally do not have a direct relationship with purchasers and users of their products. Manufacturers also do not have a traditional special relationship with those
harmed by their products. An unduly narrow interpretation and ap-

253. See Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Common-Law Right of Action for Damage Sustained by
Plaintiffin Consequence of Sale or Gift of IntoxicatingLiquor or Habit-ForningDrug to Another, 97
A.L.R.3d 528 (1980) (containing an overview of the law in this area).
254. See Poole, 732 S.W.2d at 310.
255. Id. at 311. Poole has since been refined by statute. See TEX. ALco. BEV. CODE ANN.
§ 2.02 (West 1995) (requiring that "at the time the provision occurred it [be] apparent to
the provider that the individual being sold, served, or provided with an alcoholic beverage
was obviously intoxicated to the extent that he presented a clear danger to himself and
others").
256. See supra notes 237-255 and accompanying text.
257. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 395, cmt. b.

80

JOURNAL

OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 4:42

plication of the special relationship rule would therefore create a substantial exemption from liability for this type of negligence.
Recognizing this, some courts have held that manufacturers can be
liable for harm resulting from their negligent distribution of
25 8
products.
For example, in Suchomajcz v. Hummel Chemical Co.,259 the Third
Circuit held that a manufacturer could be liable for negligence under
Pennsylvania law for negligently selling chemicals to a company that
the manufacturer knew or should have known would use the chemicals to make and sell firecracker assembly kits in violation of federal
law and several federal injunctions. 26" A child purchased a kit and left
a portion of it in a bottle in a park.2 6 ' Someone threw a match into
the bottle and it exploded, killing two children and injuring four
others. 26 2 Despite the lack of a traditional special relationship between the chemical manufacturer and the kit purchaser or any of the
other children involved, the court held that Pennsylvania negligence
law imposes a duty upon a manufacturer for harm caused by foresee26
able misuse of its product.

3

In another case involving products hazardous to children, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that "a manufacturer, wholesaler, and
retailer of a manufactured product owe a legal obligation of due care
to a bystander affected by use of the product. ' ' 264 The case, Moning v.
Alfono, involved a twelve-year old plaintiff shot in the eye with a slingshot purchased by his eleven-year old playmate.2 6 5 The court emphasized that "[t]he issue in the instant case is not whether slingshots
should be manufactured, but the narrower question of whether marketing slingshots directly to children creates an unreasonable risk of
harm. ' 26 6 Relying in part on empirical evidence about the frequency
of injuries to children from the use of slingshots, the court held that
the manufacturer and wholesaler, as well as the retailer who directly
sold the product to the consumer who misused it, could be liable
267
under negligence law.
258. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 496 (8th Cir. 1968);
Pouncey v. Ford Motor Co., 464 F.2d 957, 960 (5th Cir. 1972); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 384
N.Y.S.2d 115, 118 (1976).
259. 524 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1975).
260. See id. at 22.
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. See id. at 25.
264. Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Mich. 1977).
265. See id.
266. Id. at 771.
267. See id. at 771-72 n.30.
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reached the
same conclusion in Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc.,2 6 8 where plaintiffs' son
died after drinking mineral spirits that were packaged in a used milk
container by a retail hardware store.2 6 9 The defendant manufacturers
sold the mineral spirits to distributors in bulk, delivering the product
to the distributors' holding tanks, and did not provide packaging for
retail sale. 27" The distributors sold the mineral spirits in fifty-five gallon drums to hardware stores, which illegally packaged them in the
2 71
milk containers.
The court held that the plaintiffs stated a claim for negligent marketing under Florida law by alleging that the manufacturers "knew or
should have known that it is a customary practice to sell mineral spirits
at the retail level in used milk containers without adequate warning of
'
their contents." 272
While the manufacturers argued that they could
avoid liability on the ground that they had no direct relationship with
retail sellers or purchasers, the court disagreed, stating that "manufacturers do not enjoy blanket protection from liability simply because
others in the chain of distribution may repackage or reformulate the
product before it reaches the ultimate 'consumer."2 7 Plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturers could exercise control over the distribution of their products and prevent or minimize this risk of harm, such
as by issuing warnings, instructing distributors and retailers to discontinue the hazardous packaging practices, or curtailing business with
2 74
distributors known to distribute the product to errant retailers.
These courts found that manufacturers could be liable for negligent distribution and marketing, even where a third party misused the
product to cause harm to the plaintiff, despite the absence of a traditional special relationship between the manufacturer and the product
user or injured person.2 7 5 Although the manufacturers tried to characterize the claims asserted as requiring them to police retail sellers
and users and to provide protection against third parties' misuse of
the products, the courts did not impose special relationship
276
requirements.

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

29 F.3d 1480 (11th Cir. 1994).
See id. at 1480.
See id. at 1482-83.
See id.
Id. at 1483.
Id. at 1485.
See id. at 1487.
See id. at 1487. See also Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759, 766 (Mich. 1977).
See Hunnings, 29 F.3d at 1485. See also Moning, 254 N.W.2d at 766.
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Courts should recognize that the duty of manufacturers of dangerous products transcends the "special relationship" limitation and
requires a duty to responsibly distribute such products. Especially in
the case of guns, where the products are sought after by criminals and
those prohibited from possessing them, the duty should extend to all
those foreseeably affected by such products. This duty will further the
interest of tort law and the public's interest in preventing gun
violence.
2.

District of Columbia Approach: Eliminating the Special
Relationship Requirement Where Justified by Public Policy
Concerns

Several jurisdictions have moved further to eliminate the special
relationship requirement across a broad range of cases.2 77 For example, the District of Columbia's courts no longer require a special relationship for a duty of care to exist, even in cases where the
defendant's misconduct could be characterized as failure to protect
plaintiff from injury inflicted by a third party. 2 78 Where a defendant
creates a risk, can foresee the harm that might result, and has the
ability to eliminate or reduce that risk, the District's courts have properly recognized that a duty of care should be imposed
regardless of
2 79
the presence or absence of special relationships.
The earliest decisions of this kind under District law dealt with
keys in the ignition.2 8 ° Courts addressing negligence claims under
District law ruled that in certain circumstances leaving a key in the
ignition of an unsecured car "might be both negligence and a legal or
'proximate' cause of a resulting accident. '281 The existence of a duty
28 2
depends upon foreseeability, not a special relationship.
The same considerations led courts applying the District's negligence law to hold that landlords of multiple-tenant buildings have a
duty to exercise reasonable care to protect tenants from a criminal
attack by a third person, even though landlord-tenant is not one of
the special relationships giving rise to such a duty under common-law
277. See, e.g., King v. Nat'l Spa & Pool Inst., Inc., 570 So. 2d 612, 617 (Ala. 1990); Delta
Tau Delta v. Johnson, 712 N.E.2d 968, 974 (Ind. 1999).
278. See East Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113, 1127 (D.C. 1990).
279. See id. at 1119.
280. See, e.g., Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Colonial Parking, Inc.
v.Morley, 391 F.2d 989, 990-91 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Schaffv. R.W. Claxton, Inc., 144 F.2d 532,
532-33 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Bell v. Colonial Parking, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 796, 798 (D.C. Cir.
1992).
281. Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
282. See Bell, 807 F. Supp. at 798.
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precedent. 21 3 The traditional rule that a landlord has no duty to pro-

tect a tenant from a criminal act by a third party developed at a time
when leases generally involved farm land rented for long periods of
time with the landlord retaining little or no oversight of the property;
"the rationale of this very broad general rule falters when it is applied
to the conditions of modern day urban apartment living. "284 As in the
key-in-the-ignition case, the District's courts emphasized that a duty
should exist where the defendant can anticipate harm and is in a position to prevent or minimize it:
And where, as here, the landlord has notice of repeated
criminal assaults and robberies, has notice that these crimes
occurred in the portion of the premises exclusively within his
control, has every reason to expect like crimes to happen
again, and has the exclusive power to take preventive action,
it does not seem unfair to place upon the landlord a duty to
take those steps which are within
his power to minimize the
28 5
predictable risk to his tenants.

Above all else, these decisions reflect a practical recognition that
liability had to be imposed on landlords, regardless of how the law
defined the scope of tort duties long ago, because landlords are the
only ones able to prevent the injuries at issue. 28 6 There are measures
to increase safety that landlords can take but tenants cannot,287just as
there are steps that gun manufacturers can take to control distribution of their products and to reduce their violent use. The landlords
claimed, as the gun makers argue now, that crime prevention is solely
the responsibility of government, but "in the fight against crime the
police are not expected to do it all; every segment of society has obligations to aid in law enforcement and to minimize the opportunities
for crime." 28 8 Manufacturers are no exception.2

89

283. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 480-87 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509, 512-13 (D.C. 1969).
284. Kline, 439 F.2d at 481.
285. Id.; see also id. at 483 ("As between tenant and landlord, the landlord is the only one
in the position to take the necessary acts of protection required. He is not an insurer, but
he is obligated to minimize the risk to his tenants.").
286. See id. at 480.
287. See id.
288. Id. at 483.
289. See id. (noting that individuals can be held liable for leaving keys in the ignition of a
car, but that "[i]n addition, auto manufacturers are persuaded to install special locking
devices and buzzer alarms").
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3. Massachusetts Approach: Rethinking the Meaning of a
Special Relationship
Massachusetts courts have moved in the same direction as the
D.C. courts, but they have done so in a different manner. Rather than
identifying specific contexts in which a special relationship should not
be required, Massachusetts courts have changed the way in which they
determine what constitutes a special relationship.29 ° They make this
determination by applying the same type of careful analysis that determines the existence and scope of any negligence duty, instead of looking to traditional legal categorizations and characterizations of
relationships.2 9 1 This analysis takes into account all. circumstances
and changes with the "evolving expectations" of society; the "most crucial factor" is whether the defendant "reasonably could foresee that he
would be expected" to protect the plaintiff and "could anticipate
2 92
harm from the failure to do SO.
Applying this more flexible approach to determining what constitutes a special relationship, Massachusetts courts have reached conclusions matching those of the District of Columbia courts. For example,
in Poskus v. Lombardo's of Randolph, Inc.,293 the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts held that a person who negligently makes the theft
of a car possible can be held liable for the thief's negligent operation
of the stolen vehicle.2 94 In Whittaker v. Saraceno,29 5 the court held that
a commercial landlord "does not have a special relationship with tenants" yet has a duty to guard against reasonably foreseeable crime
risks.2 96
Moreover, Massachusetts courts have extended this reasoning to
the context of liability for distribution of products. They have established that one who negligently makes a product available to those
prohibited by law from obtaining it can be held liable for the foreseeable resulting harm.2 97 Sales to prohibited purchasers "set in motion
the very harm which the Legislature has attempted to prevent" and
therefore all who distribute these products "must exercise the care of
a reasonably prudent person" in order to avoid circumvention of the
290. See Irwin v. Town of Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292, 1300 (Mass. 1984).
291. See id. at 1300, 1303.
292. Id.
293. 670 N.E.2d 383 (Mass. 1996).
294. Id. at 385.
295. 635 N.E.2d 1185 (Mass. 1994).
296. Id. at 1187.
297. See Tobin v. Norwood Country Club, Inc., 661 N.E.2d 627, 632 (Mass. 1996) (alcohol); Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon's Liquor, Inc., 453 N.E.2d 430, 431-33 (Mass. 1983)
(alcohol); Pudlo v. Dubiel, 173 N.E. 536, 536-37 (Mass. 1930) (ammunition).
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statutes and frustration of the legislature's effort to protect the public. 298 Massachusetts courts have recognized that this tort duty is particularly vital because businesses otherwise have a financial incentive
to circumvent the restrictions on their sales.29 9
While most of these cases have involved defendants at the retail
level of distribution, the courts' decisions have established principles
that should apply even to those who indirectly supply the product to
the prohibited purchaser. The duty is triggered if the defendant knew
or reasonably should have known that its actions enabled prohibited
purchasers to obtain the product, and that requirement can be satisfied by a manufacturer or wholesale distributor. 30 0 A contrary rule
would permit anyone to profit from sales to prohibited purchasers
merely by selling through intermediaries. Moreover, the Massachusetts courts have indicated that it is immaterial that the defendant is
not in a position to know exactly which of its products go to prohibited purchasers, if it knows or should know that many do.30 '
For example, the Supreme Judicial Court has held that, by analogy to alcohol distribution cases, a movie studio "owed a duty of reasonable care to members of the public . . . with respect to the
producing, exhibiting, and advertising of movies," even though there
was no direct interaction between the studio and moviegoers. 0 2
While the Supreme Judicial Court declined in one case to find that an
alcohol manufacturer owed a duty of care to a person injured by a
drunk driver, the allegations and claims in that case did not suggest
any manner in which the manufacturer had the ability to prevent or
reduce the risk of harm through its control over distribution of its
product. 30 3 When the evidence establishes a defendant manufacturer's creation of a risk of harm and its ability to prevent or to reduce
it by its control over distribution, the principles of Massachusetts negligence law dictate that a duty exists.30 4

298. Michnik-Zilberman, 453 N.E.2d at 433; see also Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 233
N.E.2d 18, 19 (Mass. 1968) ("[t]he legislative policy, being clear, is not to be rendered
futile of practical accomplishment").
299. See Tobin, 661 N.E.2d at 634, 636.
300. See id. at 632-33 (rejecting the argument that defendant can be held liable only for
"an actual 'hand to hand' transaction or its equivalent").
301. See id. at 635 (no need to prove defendant "knew or had reason to know that any
particular drink was reaching a particular minor").
302. Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067, 1071 (Mass. 1989).
303. See O'Sullivan v. Hemisphere Broad. Corp., 520 N.E.2d 1301, 1302-03 (Mass. 1988).
304. See supra notes 297-301 and accompanying text.
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New Jersey Approach: Making Special Relationships Merely One
FactorAmong Many in Defining the Scope of Duties of Care

New Jersey courts have approached the problem in their own
way, but they have also prevented a special relationship requirement
from eliminating duties of care when they should be recognized. Like
courts elsewhere in the country, New Jersey courts have made clear
that no special relationship is required where the defendants' misfeasance creates or unreasonably enhances a danger to plaintiff, regardless of the presence of a special relationship. °5 For example, while
holding that a landlord and tenant do not have a special relationship
requiring the landlord to protect the tenant from a criminal act of a
third person, New Jersey courts have established that a landlord can
be held liable for undertaking an affirmative act that unreasonably
enhances a foreseeable risk. °6
New Jersey courts have moved away from the traditional special
relationship rule even in cases where the plaintiff claims that defendant had a duty to protect plaintiff from a danger that defendant did
not create or enhance. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has indicated that the presence of a "special relationship" should be only one
factor among many that New Jersey courts can consider in defining
duties under negligence law, not an absolute requirement." 7 The
concept of duty under negligence law should not be "a rigid formalism according to the standards of a simpler society, immune to the
equally compelling needs of the present order."30 8 While courts "traditionally" imposed a duty to protect only on "selected individuals
based on their status," New Jersey courts have favored "a broadening
application of a general tort obligation to exercise reasonable care
against foreseeable harm to others."' 9 New Jersey courts thus determine whether a duty to protect exists by looking to essentially the
305. See, e.g., Poole v. Janeski, 611 A.2d 169, 170 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) (duty
exists when a "person's conduct has created a perilous situation"); Lombardo v. Hoag, 566
A.2d 1185, 1187 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989) (duty exists where "a person by his prior
conduct has created a situation of peril to another"), overruled, 634 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1993), cert. denied, 640 A.2d 850 (N.J. 1994).
306. See Williams v. Gorman, 520 A.2d 761, 763 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986);
Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436, 440 (N.J. 1980); Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp.,
346 A.2d 76, 80 (N.J. 1975).
307. See Snyder v. Am. Ass'n of Blood Banks, 676 A.2d 1036, 1048 (N.J. 1996) (explaining that the absence of a special relationship "is not dispositive" of duty determination);
Atamian v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 369 A.2d 38, 43 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976)
(stating that New Jersey law rejects the "restrictive" approach requiring "one of the traditional special relationships").
308. Nytupeck v. City of Camden, 136 A.2d 887, 894 (N.J. 1957).
309. Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 445 A.2d 1141, 1143 (NJ. 1982).
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same factors that determine the existence of any duty under negligence law - foreseeability, the nature of the risk, the opportunity to
exercise care, and the interests of the public.'
CONCLUSION

Gun manufacturers should be held liable for the foreseeable consequences of negligently distributing guns. They engage in affirmative acts that create severe risks of harm, and in doing so they commit
misfeasance, for which negligence law has never required a "special
relationship" for a duty of care to be imposed.3 1 The manufacturers'
negligent conduct cannot properly be characterized as mere nonfeasance for which liability would depend on the existence of a "special
relationship" between gun makers and the victims or perpetrators of
gun violence.3 12 Misguided decisions viewing gun manufacturers' distribution practices as mere nonfeasance could be avoided by a better
means of analyzing duty issues in negligence cases. Courts should recognize that there is a spectrum between misfeasance and nonfeasance, rather than a strict dichotomy, and that the location of a
defendant's negligent conduct on that spectrum should be an important factor in defining the existence and scope of a defendant's duty
of care, but not a factor that controls the duty issue without regard to
any other factors or circumstances. Courts have already begun to
move away from the most rigid version of the "special relationship"
rule. 13 The time has arrived for complete retirement of that means
of analyzing duty issues.

310. SeeJ.S. v. R. T. H., 714 A.2d 330, 338 (N.J. 1998); Kuzmicz v. Ivy Hill Park Apts.,
Inc., 688 A.2d 1018, 1020 (N.J. 1997).
311. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 160-174 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 277-310 and accompanying text.

